Lucht NOTICE OF CLAIM FORM to the City of Saint Paul, Minnesota
Minnesota State Statute 466.05 states that"...every person...who claims damages from any►nunicipaliry...shall cause to be presented to the
governing body of the municipality within 180 days after the alleged loss or injury is discovered a notice stating the time,place,and
circumstances thereof,and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded."
Please complete this form in its entirety by clearly typing or printing your answer to each question. If more space is
needed,attach additional sheets. Please note that you will not be contacted by telephone to clarify answers,so pmvide as
much information as necessary to explain your clairo,and the amount of compensation being requested. You will receive a
written acknowledgement once your form is received. The process can take up to ten weel�s or longer depending on the
nature of your claim. This form must be signed,and both pages completed. If something dces not apply,write`N/A'.
SEND COMPLETED FORM AND OTHER DOCUMENTS TO: CITY CLERK,
15 WEST KELLOGG BLVD, 310 CITY HALL, SAINT PAUL,MN 55102
First Name ��'.S 1 i e Middle Initialh� I.ast Name �^ �-C_�7
��VEU
Company or Business Name
A 1 �2
Are You an Insurance Company? Yes� If Yes,Claim Number?
Street Address �Q�� C-���-'t t���w� -�`��� ��`�"�
City -S I , /��/`�L State j''1 n� Zip Code��
Daytime Phone( 5�() 3�Q��e11 Phone( ) Evening Telephone(�S �) ��- ��.��f
Date of Accident/Injury or Date Discovered `�v.� �/ �3; ?c /2. Time a ��� �►i/pm
Please state,in detail,what occurred(happened),and why you are submitting a claim.Please indicate why or how you
feel the City of Saint Paul or its emplo ees e involved�}d/or responsible f r our ages. �
1^ i��,./:v� -� !��`��� U��✓'� � t / ��. � o'�. �
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Please check the box(es)that most closely represent the reason for completing this form:
❑My vehicle was damaged in an accident ❑My vehicle was damaged during a tow
❑My vehicle was damaged by a pothole or condition of the street ❑My vehicle was damaged by a plow
❑My vehicle was wrongfully towed and/or ticketed ❑I was injured on City pr perty
f�Other type of property da�e—please specify �c�c-� 7�r� �u� t.c.,!� .�.,�o�,v� ���iJ /�oiCS�
❑Other type of injury—please specify
In order to process your claim vou need to include copies of all auulicable documents.
For the claims types listed below,please be sure to include the documents indicated or it will delay the handling of
your claim. Documents WILL NOT be returned and become the property of the City. You are encouraged to keep a
copy for yourself before submitting your claim form.
O Property damage claims to a vehicle: two estimates for the repairs to your vehicle if the damage exceeds
$500.00;or the actual bills and/or receipts for the repairs
O Towing claims: legible copies of any ticket issued and a copy of the impound lot receipt
O Other property damage claims:two repair esdmates if the damage exceeds$500.00;or the actual bills
and/or receipts for the repairs;detailed list of damaged items
O Injury claims: medical bills,receipts
O Photographs aze always welcome to document and support your claim but will not be returned.
Page 1 of 2—Please complete and return both pages of Claim Form
Failure to complete and return both pages will result in delay in the handling of your claim.
All Claims—please complete this section
Were there wimesses to the incident? � No Unknown (circle)
Provide their names,addresses and telephone numbe s:
� �'�� R��-�r � -� S��_ If, �r.�
Were the police or law enforcement called? Yes � Unlmown (circle)
If yes,what department or agency? Case#or report#
Where did the accident or injury take place? Provide street address,cross street,intersection,name of park or facility,
closest landmark,etc. Please be as detailed as possible. If necessary,attach a diagram.
Please indicate the amount you aze seeking in compensation or what you would like the City to do to resolve this claim ,
to your satisfaction. I
Vehicle Claims—ulease comnlete this section ❑check box if this section does not applv
Your Vehicle: Year Make Model
License Plate Number State Color
Registered Owner
Driver of Vehicle
Area Damaged
City Vehicle: Yeaz Make Model
License Plate Number State Color
Driver of Vehicle(City Employee's Name)
Area Damaged
In_iu�Claims—nlease comnlete this section ❑check box if this section does not applv
How were you injured?
What part(s)of your body were injured?
Have you sought medical treatment? Yes o i Planning to Seek Treatment(circle)
When did you receive treatment? (provide date(s))
Name of Medical Provider(s): I
Address Telephone I
Did you nuss work as a result of your injury? Yes �._ I
When did you miss work? (provide date(s)) '
Name of your Employer:
Address Telephone
�Check here if you are attaching more pages to this claim form. Number of additional pages.�.
By signing this for►n,you are stating that all information you have provided is true and correct to the best
of your knowledge. Unsigned forms will not be processed.
Submitting a false claim can result in prosecution. Date form was completed �/ i�/ ,�c�/`Z—
Print the Name of the Person who Completed this Form: �.2 `�( t� e �, �-c-�C...�_.�
Signature of Person Malang the Claim: ��%—� �� ���C�
Revised Febru 2011 � G'1 Ull /�U r�"����C �C�� S� Ll
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PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCY �
I
August 10, 2012
Leslie K. Lucht
1090 Cumberland Street �
Saint Paul, Minnesota 55117
Dear Mr. Lucht:
We received your August 6, 20121etter to Jon Gutzmann, Executive Director of the Saint Paul
Public Housing Agency(PHA), in which you asked the PHA to pay you $1,850.00. You stated you
spent that amount in 2009 "to bring [your rental property at 685 Van Buren Avenue (Apartment
#1)] up to code". You attached to your letter an inspection report dated Apri16, 2009 that lists
several deficiencies cited by a PHA employee who inspected the unit for continued eligibility to
receive Section 8 subsidies. Item#6 on that list states as follows:
"The egress window in both rear bedrooms measured 19" high. The minimal
egress opening required is 24"high by 20" wide. Every bedroom must have at
least one legal egress window."
You referred in your letter to a recent decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals regarding the
City of Saint Paul's interpretation and enforcement of building safety codes.
I'our request for payment ap�ears more appropriately directecl to the City�f Saint Paul, the entity
that instituted the policy on egress windows. The Saint Paul Public Housing Agency is a legal
entity entirely separate from the City. In fact, the PHA is also subject to the City's policies (and
does not create City policy). The PHA cannot reimburse you for your claimed expense because of a
City policy.
Sincerely,
A1 Hester
Housing Policy Director
W.Andrew Boss Building • 555 North Wabasha Street • Suite 400 • Saint Paul,Minnesota 55102-1 E �
651-298-5664 • Fax 298-5666 °�°°^n�m
i ���:�;� ,I1�: 1�: . � : t �� ' � i.��,
y ioso am►ne�ana sc
� Sairrt Paul,MN 55117
Home(651)489-7436
; Cell(651)329-0322
`: 1es19602003@pahoo.00m
A�gnst 6,2012
10a M.Ga�pp
Exd�tive Dlrocio�
Saint Pa�PubNc Horsin8 A�en�r
Satnt Penl,MN 55102 ,
Mr.1oa M.Gumnann� �
This IetGer is re�s�aa a reoeAt Mspec�ioa thst was pa/unned on Ap�3.2009 b�r Safnt PaW PubNc �,�
Ho�siag Age�q.Atber tbe i�spectlon was perfom�ed the fsspcc�pr 8,uve mq nN�685 Va�Bwe�Are Apt#�1�e �
namber of de�eades i�ila�epoR '
As lrou rn�be sware of eow,tb�State of Minnesota CaR of ApPeals s�Led tAat safetp codes dces nar
suPersead boi�e6 codes.l am eow inqWdng on�hriest�e mone�rtl�at I wasforoed to used tu brfag t�e
b�ilding bad��p�c oode.O�a11 the total cost that 1 sm seeki��dYe to tl�is i�specrioa is 51,850.00.I sm �
Mfedng a 5 dap sotloe tio neaire tMs payment,if t�ps�rt is�reoeived drdn�tMs perfod 1 wiN tske�ou
sad the SaiM Pa�d P�bik Ho�aing Agen�7r�o sn�ap dain�s�p co��p�t
Attsched ta tNs lel�is also a copp of fAe i�s�d whst w�s fo�wd is d�de�r If tAene s�aa�r I
4�ons ple�se fed iroe to qY me or enaN me r�qdi�tlK n�er.
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STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A11-2270
Builders Association of Minnesota,
Appellant,
vs.
City of St. Paul,
Respondent.
Filed July 23, 2012
Reversed aod remanded
Collins, Judge*
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-11-2436 '
Joseph G. Springer, Fredrikson& Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota(for appellant)
Sara R. Grewing, St. Paul City Attorney, Judith A. Hanson, Assistant City Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Cleary, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and Collins,
Judge.
SYLLABUS '
A city may not circumvent the preemption provisions of the state building code by !'
indirectly adopting its own building regulation through a "policy" rather than an '
i
ordinance or formal enactment. The state building code preempts such municipal
policies to the same extent that it preempts municipalities' ordinances or formal
enactments that differ from the uniform state code.
* Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals
by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
OPINION
COLLINS, Judge
Appellant Builders Association of Minnesota (BAM) challenges the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent City of St. Paul. BAM argues
that the district court ened as a matter of law in determining that the state building code
did not preempt the city's promulgation of a uniform egress-window policy. We agree,
and reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of BAM.
FACTS
The facts underlying this case are undisputed. In April 2009, the city's
Department of Safety and Inspections adopted a "Uniform Egress Window Policy" in a
memorandum addressed to St. Paul homeowners and interested citizens. The policy was ,
not enacted or adopted by the city counciL It purports to resolve the confusion between I
"various code re uirements for e ess windows." It notes the distinct hazard to life and '
q �
safety posed by noncompliant egress windows. Ii
,
The policy itself requires replacement egress windows to conform to a minimum
�
size. The sole exception to the minimum-size requirement is for windows installed
before the policy's effective date. The policy provides an avenue for appeal to the city
council, and requires the council to consider in any appeal the effect on affordable
housing, "provided that the spirit of the code is complied with and public safety is
secured." '
BAM is a nonprofit trade association whose members are involved in the
residential construction and remodeling industry. Some of its members perform
2
residential remodeling work in St. Paul. The ciry's egress-window policy had a
detrimental economic impact on BAM members' businesses. Following the policy's
adoption, some homeowners were reluctant to replace egress windows due to the added
expense involved in resizing window frames and rough openings to comply with the
city's policy.l
BAM brought this action seeking (1) a declaratory judgment recognizing that the
state building code preempts the city's egress-window policy, and (2) an injunction
prohibiting the city from enforcing the policy. The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. In the memorandum supporting its motion, the city argued that
BAM lacked sta.nding to sue. The district court entered an order recognizing BAM's
standing, concluding that because its members had suffered concrete economic injury, ,
BAM has associational standing.
The district court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the city. It �
i
concluded that (1) the state building code did not preempt the city's egress-window
policy because the preemption statute applied only to municipal ordinances and
development agreements, not to policies; (2) the policy conformed to the egress-window
requirements set forth in the state fire code; and (3) any conflict between the state
building code and the state fire code was best left to the legislature or rulemaking
authorities to resolve. This appeal followed.
1 A "rough opening" is the framed area into which a window assembly is installed.
Increasing the rough opening involves more labor, time, and expense than merely
replacing the window itself.
3
ISSUES
L Does BAM possess associational standing to bring suit challenging the city's
policy?
II. Was BAM required to e�aust administrative remedies before bringing suit?
III. Does the state building code preempt the city's attempt to adopt a "Uniform
Egress Window Policy"that differs from the state building code?
ANALYSIS
I.
On appeal, the city axgues in a footnote that BAM lacks standing to bring this
action. A challenge to sta.nding implicates the validity of the cause of action itsel£ State
ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Minn. 1985). The
issue may therefore be raised at any time. In re Horton, 668 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Minn.
App. 2003). Because standing is a question of law, we review the district court's
determination de novo. Schi,�`'v. Gri�n, 639 N.W.2d 56, 59 (Minn. App. 2002). I
The doctrine of standing requires a party to demonstrate a "sufficient stake in a i
justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court." Enright v. Lehmann, 735 N.W.2d
326, 329 (Minn. 2007). To establish standing, a party must have suffered "some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant." In re
Crown CoCo, Inc., 458 N.W.2d 132, 135 (Minn. App. 1990) (quotation omitted). The
injury must be traceable to the challenged action, and it must be capable of being
redressed in court. Id. Economic injury may be sufficient to establish standing, so long
as it is not abstract or speculative. State v. Knutson, 523 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Minn. App.
4
1994), review denied (Minn. Jan. 13, 1995); Byrd v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 194, 495
N.W.2d 226, 231 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied(Minn. Apr. 20, 1993).
An organization can assert standing if its members' interests are directly at sta.ke
or if its members have suffered an injury-in-fact. State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris
Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 497-98 (Minn. 1996); Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers, Local 59 v.
Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied(Minn.
Mar. 31, 1994). Here, BAM submitted evidence that its members had suffered economic
detriment as a direct result of the city's egress-window policy. One of BAM's members,
the president of a remodeling business, attested to his company's loss of revenue as a
result of the policy because customers decided not to replace their egress windows when
they learned of the extra time and expense involved in complying with the city's policy.
And as a number of BAM's members offered remodeling services in St. Paul, the policy
directly affected their interests as well. Thus, because BAM's members suffered
economic injuries, BAM itself derived associational standing to bring the action. The
district court did not err in determining that BAM has standing.
II.
The city also argues that BAM should have first challenged the policy through i
i
administrative channels. The district court apparently accepted this argument, concluding ,I
that BAM "should take the matter up with either the legislaiure or the rulemaking body i
that interprets the legislation—DOLI [the Department of Labor and Industry] in this
case." Although not explicitly, this conclusion appears to address e�austion of
administrative remedies.
5
Like standing, the e�austion doctrine implicates a party's ability to seek relief in
court and may be raised at any time. See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Metro. Airports Comm'n,
672 N.W.2d 379, 381-82 (Minn. App. 2003) (addressing whether the failure to e�aust
remedies deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction), review denied (Minn. Feb. 25,
2004). Whether the e�chaustion doctrine applies is a determination of law, which this
court reviews de novo. Modrow v. JP Foodserv., Inc., 656 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Minn.
2003).
When seeking an injunction against an administrative agency, a party must first
e�aust administrative remedies unless those remedies are "inadequate or nonexistent."
Zaluckyj v. Rice Creek Watershed Dist., 639 N.W.2d 70, 74 (Minn. App. 2002), review
denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2002); accord Uckun v. Minn. State Bd. of Med. Practice, 733
N.W.2d 778, 785 (Minn. App. 2007). The city contends that because the commissioner
of the state Department of Labor and Industry has final interpretive authority over the
state building code, BAM should have first sought redress from the commissioner before
bringing suit. See generally Minn. Stat. § 326B.127, subd. 5 (2010) (establishing ,
;
commissioner's interpretive authority). The city also relies on a statute that authorizes
the commissioner to administer and enforce the state building code, particularly when
municipalities fail to properly do so. See generally Minn. Stat. § 326B.121, subd. 3
(2010) (authorizing commissioner to administer and enforce the state building code). �
Here, however, the dispute does not primarily concern the administration or
enforcement of the state building code. Rather, it centers on whether the egress-window
provisions of the state building code "trump" broader provisions in the state fire code
6
and, if so, whether the state building code also preempts the city's egress-window policy.
Although these questions require interpreting the state building code, they also
necessitate interpreting the city's policy and the state fire code, neither of which fall
within the commissioner's interpretative authority. Thus, no adequate administrative
remedies were available for BAM to pursue. To the extent the district court determined
that BAM failed to e�aust available administrative remedies, it erred as a matter of law.
III.
BAM argues that the district court erred in granting the city summary judgment
based on the court's conclusion that the state building code did not preempt the city's
egress-window policy. Summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and (2) the moving pariy is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Minn. 2008). "When summary
judgment is granted based on application of the law to undisputed facts," as here, we
review the district court's legal conclusion de novo. Id.
A. Conflict between state building code and state fire code
Pursuant to its delegated authority, in 2007 the Department of Labor and Industry
adopted the 2006 International Building Code, the 2006 International Residential Code,
and the 2006 International Fire Code, subject to certain amendments.2 See Minn. Stat. i
,I
2 The International Building and Residential Codes have both been incorporated into the
state building code by reference. Minn. R. 1305.0011 (building code) (2011), 1309.0010
(residential code) (2011). The term "state building code" therefore refers to the
International Building Code and the International Residential Code, subject to the
exceptions, amendments, and qualifications to those codes as set forth in the
7
§§ 3268.02, subd. 6, .106, subd. 1 (2010) (delegating rulemaking authority to the
commissioner of labor and industry); Minn. R. 1305.0011 (2011) (adopting international
building code), 1309.0010 (2011) (adopting international residential code), 7511.0090
(2011) (adopting international fire code); 32 Minn. Reg. 7, 10, 12 (2007). The
legislature's express purpose for adopting a statewide building code was to "provide
basic and uniform performance standards, [and] establish reasonable safeguards for
health, safety, welfare, comfort, and security of the residents of this state." Minn. Stat.
§ 326B.101 (2010). It also sought to foster construction "at the least possible cost
consistent with recognized standards of health and safety." Id.
The state building code sets forth minimum sizes and requirements for installing
egress windows. Int'1 Bldg. Code § 1026.2-.3 (Int'1 Code Council 2006); Int'1 Res. Code
§ R310.1 (Int'1 Code Counci12006). However, when the responsible department adopted
the building code, it also adopted a state-specific amendment to the minimum-size
requirements for certa.in egress windows. Minn. R. 1309.0310 (2011), 32 Minn. Reg. 13
(2007). This amendment provides that when egress windows are replaced in certain
i
residential dwellings, the replacement windows must be the largest size that will fit into ;
I
the exrsting frame or rough opening. Id. The amendment thus creates an exception to the '
,
minimum-size requirements by permitting homeowners to replace existing egress I
windows without having to increase the size of the frame and rough opening, thereby I,
I
I
I
administrative rules. See generally Minn. R. chs. 1300, 1309 (2011) (amending certain
provisions of the International Building and Residential Codes).
8
avoiding substantial additional expense. It is undisputed that the city's policy did not
contain this crucial exception to the minimum-size requirements.
Similarly, although the state fire code provides the same basic size requirements
for egress windows as the building code, it does not contain the exception for
replacement windows. See Int'1 Fire Code § 1026.2-.3 (Int'1 Code Council 2006). As a
result, the two codes appear to conflict with regard to the exception for replacement
egress windows. In an attempt to resolve this conflict, the district court concluded that
the policy did not violate sta.te law because it implemented the requirements set forth in
the fire code.
Canons of statutory construction lead us to the opposite conclusion.3 The
legislature has provided that "[w]hen a general provision in a law is in conflict with a
special provision in the same or another law, the two shall be construed, if possible, so
that effect may be given to both." Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2010). When provisions
of law irreconcilably conflict, the more particularized provision takes precedence over the
general. Id.; Ford v. Emerson Elec. Co., 430 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Minn. App. 1988),
review denied(Minn. Dec. 16, 1988). These canons ensure that all provisions of law are
effective, and none are unnecessary or incapable of execution. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17
(2010) (noting that courts may presume "the legislature intends the entire statute to be
effective and certa.in").
3 The canons of statutory construction also apply to administrative rules. Minn. Stat.
§ 645.001 (2010).
9
Here, the statutory language indicates that the state-specific exception in the
building code for replacement egress windows is controlling. The implementing statute
for the sta.te fire code prohibits municipalities from enacting fire-prevention standards
that "exceed the applicable requirements of the State Building Code." Minn. Stat.
§ 299F.011, subd. 4 (2010). The state fire code's absolute minimum-size requirements
for egress windows exceed those in the state building code because they are more
restrictive. Thus, municipalities are expressly precluded from adopting regulations that
omit the exception for replacement egress windows.
Additionally, the amendment to the state building code is more particularized than
the fire code, as it carves out an exception to the general rules regarding minimum egress-
window sizes.4 Accordingly, the exception in the building code for replacement windows
must take precedence over municipalities' enactments of the absolute requirements set
forth in the state fire code. A contrary interpretation would result in the exception having
no effect.
The intent of the responsible department in adopting the egress-window exception
also supports according it preclusive effect. The department, in a division opinion, stated
that the rulemaking committee did not consider adopting an absolute minimum size for
4 The provisions of the International Residential Code incorporated into the state building
code also have a more narrow application: they apply only to certain dwellings of no ,
more than three stories in height. See Minn. R. 1300.0040 (2011) (setting forth the scope ,
and applicability of different provisions of the state building code). By contrast, the state
fire code applies more generally to "(s]tructures, facilities and conditions." Minn. R. ,
75.11.0102, subp.l (2011). As the replacement-window exception applies to certain ,
dwellings covered by the more specific scope of Minn. R. ch. 1309, its application is
more particularized than the general requirements set forth in the state fire code. See
Minn. R. 1309.0310 (carving out an exception for only certain buildings).
10
replacement windows because the exception was intended to encourage residents to
replace old or inoperable windows. The department thus implicitly recognized that the
exception promotes the goals of safety and fire prevention, thereby advancing the
purpose of the state building code to lower construction costs while protecting the health
and safety of residents. See Minn. Stat. § 326B.101 (stating the legislature's purpose for
establishing a state building code).
The city argues that the state fire code, and not the building code, governs in this
case because the fire code applies to "[e]xisting structures, facilities and conditions that,
in the opinion of the [state fire marshal], constitute a distinct hazard to life and property."
Minn. R. 7511.0102, subp. 1 (2011); see Minn. Stat. §§ 299F.01, .011 (2010)
(designating state fire marshal as responsible code official). But the state building code
does not exempt from its application those structures deemed to constitute a haza.rd in the
opinion of the state fire marshal. To the contrary, its application is e��tremely broad. See
Minn. Stat. § 326B.121, subd. 1(a) (Supp. 2011) (setting forth code's broad application);
Minn. R. 1300.0040 (2011) (establishing that the building code "applies to the
construction, alteration, moving, demolition, repair, and use of any building, structure, or
building service equipment in a municipality," apart from certain exceptions that are not
relevant here). The legislature expressly provided that the state building code "is the
standard that applies statewide for the construction, reconstruction, alteration, and repair
of buildings and other structures of the type governed by the code." Minn. Stat. �
§ 326B.121, subd. 1(a). Moreover, the purpose of the building code is, in part, to ensure
reasonable safeguards for the health and safety of residents. Minn. Stat. § 326B.101. In
11
enacting the state building code and requiring it to supersede all other building codes, the
legislature was mindful of the oveniding public concern for fire prevention and safety.
City of Minnetonka v. Mark Z. Jones Assocs., 306 Minn. 217, 222-23, 236 N.W.2d 163,
167 (1975). As a result, the state fire code does not supersede the building code, even
with regard to those requirements that the state fire marshal deems necessary to ensure a
minimum level of fire prevention.
Because the state building code takes precedence over the �re code with regard to
the exception for replacing egress windows, the district court erred in concluding that the
city's policy did not violate state law because it implemented the fire-code requirements.
B. Preemption of municipal regulations
BAM argues that the district court ened in concluding that the state building code
did not preempt the city's policy. The crux of the district court's decision is that the state
building code preempts only municipal ordinances and development agreements, and
because the city's policy was neither of those things, it was not preempted.
Municipalities possess only those powers expressly conferred by sta.tute and those
necessary to carry out their express authority. Mangold Midwest Co. v. Vill. of Richfield,
274 Minn. 347, 357, 143 N.W.2d 813, 820 (1966). Among other powers, they may enact
ordinances and regulations to promote the health, safety, and welfare of residents. Minn. i
i
Stat. §§ 410.07, 412.221, subd. 32 (2010). However, the state may "limit the power of a i
city to act in a particular area," for example by fully occupying a field of legislation and '
preempting local regulation in that field. Ciry of Morris v. Sax Irrvs., Inc., 749 N.W.2d 1,
6 (Minn. 2008).
12
The legislature's purpose in enacting the state building code was to set forth a
uniform standard for the construction, reconstruction, alteration, and repair of buildings
throughout the state. Minn. Stat. §§ 326B.101, .121, subd. 1(a); see also City of Morris,
749 N.W.2d at 7 (recognizing the purpose of a uniform, statewide building code). Prior
to its adoption, municipalities enforced a wide range of building code requirements,
resulting in confusion and increased construction costs. See 1971 Minn. Laws ch. 561,
§ 1, at 1018-19 (noting multiplicity of local rules that increased construction costs).
Accordingly, the legislature enacted a preemption provision that [subject to certain
caveats which are not relevant here] limits the authority of municipalities to enact
differing building code requirements. This provision states that "[a] municipality must
not by ordinance, or through development agreement, require building code provisions
regulating components or systems of any structure that are different from any provision
of the State Building Code." Minn. Stat. § 326B.121, subd. 2(c) (2010). It further
provides that "[t]he State Building Code supersedes the building code of any
municipality." Id., subd. 1(b) (Supp. 2011).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has established a three-part test for applying this
preemption provision. City of Morris, ?49 N.W.2d at 7. The state building code
preempts municipal regulation when "(1)the [municipal] ordinance is a building code
provision; (2) it regulates a component or system of a residential structure; and (3) it is
different from a provision of the State Building Code." Id.
The city and district court agree that if the egress-window policy were an
ordinance or development agreement, the state building code would expressly preempt it.
13
The policy regulates a component of a residential structure (egress windows), and it
differs from the state building code as it does not conta.in the exception for replacement
windows. The dispute thus centers on the first prong: whether the policy constitutes a
building code provision.
The supreme court has broadly defined "building code provision" to encompass
any regulation that "affects the construction and design of buildings" if the subject of the
regulation is covered by the state building code. Id. at 8 (quota.tion omitted). Thus, in
City of Morris, the supreme court held that a rental-licensing ordinance imposing
requirements for egress-window covers was a building code provision because its
subject—egress windows—was covered by the state building code. Id. at 12. Similarly,
in City of Minnetonka, the supreme court held that the state building code preempted a
local fire-code provision that imposed certain lighting and sprinkler requirements that
differed from the state building-code provisions. 306 Minn. at 218-19, 223, 236 N.W.2d
at 164-65, 167. But as both of those cases dealt with ordinances, and not policies, they
are not squarely on point.
The distinction between an ordinance and the challenged policy in this case is a
matter of semantics, not substance. By its express terms, the state building code
preempts not only ordinances and policies, but also "the building code of any
municipality." Minn. Stat. § 326B.121, subd. 1(b) (emphasis added). The statute does
not define the terms "ordinance" and "building code." We must therefore look to their
ordinary and customary meaning. See State v. Taylor, 594 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Minn. App.
1999) ("A court construes technical words in a statute according to their technical
14
meaning and other words according to common and accepted usage."). An ordinance is
commonly defined as an "authoritative law or decree," especially "a municipal
regulation." Black's Law Dictionary 1208 (9th ed. 2009); see also The American
Heritage Dictionary 1274 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "ordinance" as "[a]n authoritative
command or order," or "[a] statute or regulation, especially one enacted by a city
government"). Similarly, the term "building code" commonly means a"law or regulation
setting forth standards for the construction, maintenance, occupancy, use, or appearance
of buildings and dwelling units." Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at 222.
The city's policy fits both of these definitions. The city does not dispute that the
policy has the force of law. Although termed a "policy" and set forth in a memorandum
rather than a more formal codification, the policy is essentially a municipal regulation
that sets forth legally enforceable requirements for egress windows. Its practical effect
would be the same whether put in place as an ordinance or a policy: under either form,
St. Paul residents cannot take advantage of the replacement-window exception allowed
by the state building code.
The city's argument centers on the fact that the policy was promulgated by the
director of the city's Department of Safety and Inspections, and not by the official
lawmaking body (the city council). However, the city council delegated to the director
the authority to prescribe "rules and regulations as deemed necessary for the proper
operation of the department." St. Paul, Minn., Admin. Code § 13.01(d) (2007). The
policy's authority thus ultimately flows from the city council. Regardless of its form, the
policy is, at bottom, a municipal rule or regulation.
15
Recognizing the policy for what it is—a municipal regulation subject to
preemption—advances the purpose of the state building code. As noted above, the
code's preemption provisions reflect a core legislative purpose to avoid the proliferation
of local building codes and regulations. City ofMorris, 749 N.W.2d at 7. If cities could
so easily enact their own building codes by simply delegating authority to another official
and calling their regulations "policies," the purpose of enacting a uniform state code
would be subverted. Moreover, by enacting such policies, cities could evade the scrutiny
of public hearings and the vetting process involved in adopting formal codes. The city
cannot indirectly accomplish through a "policy" what it is precluded from accomplishing
through an ordinance.
In sum, the state building code preempts the city's policy regulating egress
window sizes. The policy functions as a building code regulation, and it differs from the
state building code. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred as a matter of
law in granting summary judgment in favor of the city.
DECISION
���ae bui�g code preempts the city's at�empt to impnse differing
requirements for egress window sizes. The city may not avoid the preemption.�i��
of the state building code by tenning its regulation a "policy" rat�ier than adopl� �'°
through formal enactment. BAM is therefore errtitled to summary judgment as a m�
:af law.
Reversed and remanded.
16