05-633Council File # O� 63 3
Ordinance #
Green Sheet # �?�a� a� `
ORDINANCE
CITY OF SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA
Presented By
Referred To
i{�o
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3 An ordinance amending Legislarive Code Chapter 64.401 pertaining to the � 2 2'�
4 regulation of signs by: Adding new language permitting certain identification
5 signs on private property and imposing regulations on the placement of such signs
6 [Leg. Code §64.401].
8 THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SAINT PAUL DOES ORDAIN:
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Section 1
That Legislative Code § 64.401 (j) is amended to read:
Sec. 64.401. All signs.
Committee Date :
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No person shall place, erect or maintain a sign, nor shall a lessee or owner permit property under
his control to be used for such a sign, which does not conform to the following requirements and
without first obtaining the requisite permit for such sign. The following provisions shall apply in
all zoning districts, and to all exterior signs visible to the general public from a public right-of-
way.
(j) For parking lot areas, one identification sign not to exceed a total of fifteen (15) square
feet in area is permitted per parking lot entrance. An identification sign up to twenty-five
(25) square feet in area, however, may be permitted if such sign incorparates the
following uniform parking symbol: fifty (50) percent of the total sign area of the parking
identification sign must bear thereon a blue rectangle with a white letter "P" in Gothic
type face with the letter "P" being not less than fifty (50) percent of the area of the blue
rectangle. The remaining portion of the sign incorparating such a pazking symbol may be
used for other pertinent information. In addition to the one (1) identification sign per
parking lot entrance, however, one (1) directional sign not to exceed a total of four (4)
square feet is perxnitted per entrance or exit. Such directional signs may be up to ten (10)
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squaze feet in azea if they also incorporate the above-prescribed parldng symbol. These
parldng idenrification and directionai signs are in addition to other signs permitted in each
zoning district. No sign shall project lugher than fifteen (15) feet above grade. For
communitvi centers and religious, civic and educational instihxtions, a masimum of two
directional si ig� s may be placed on private proroe alon� two different arterial or
collector streets within 2.500' of the communitvi center or institution, providin a¢ valid
lease indicating the consent of the owners of the pro�ertv where the si�s are to be
located is on file with the city, that the �soss surface displav area does not exceed five (51
sauare feet per sign on residential propertv or fifteen 151 sctuaze feet per si n�on
nonresidential property and that the heig�t does not exceed seven- and one-half (7'/�l feet.
Section 2
This ordinance shall become effective thirty (30) days after its passage, approval and publication.
.
#r 1,;
Adopted by Council:
Adoption Certified
�� �
�'L r�
Requested by Department of:
L.L.E.P.
BY: Q�.u.�- C� � �*oa
,
Form Approved by City Attorney
os-�33
� Green Sheet Green Sheet Green Sheet Green Sheet Green Sheet Green Sheet �
DepartmenUoffice/councii: Date Initiated:
Lp — [.��s�tnspecno�awoar�oc o�,��-05 Green Sheet NO: 3027234
Contad Person & Phone: Deoartment Sent To Person initiai/Date
WendyLane � � 0 icensellos ecti n/Environ o --S`0 t
26&9��$ Auign 1 icense/Ins ectioo/EnvironPro De ar[mentDirector �'
Must Be on Council Agenda by (Date): Number 2 � Att rne 7 �J' ��
For
Routing 3 or's O�ce Ma odAssisfant
prd¢� 4 uneil
5 Cierk Ci Clerk
Total # of Signature Pages _(Clip All Loeations for Signature)
Action Requested:
Approval of an ordinance amending Saint Paul Legislative Code (SPLC) Chapter 64.401 pertaining to the regulation of signs by adding
new language permitting certain identificarion signs on private properiy.
Recommendations: Approve (A) or Reject (R): Personal Service ContracGs Must Mswer the Following Questions:
Planning Commission 1. Has this personffirm ever worked under a contrad for ihis department?
CIB Committee Yes No
Civil Service Commission 2. Has this personffirm ever been a city employee?
Yes No
3. Does this person/firm possess a skill not normally possessed by any
current city employee?
Yes No
Explain alI yes answers on separate sheet and atWch to green sheet
Initiating Problem, lssues, OppoRunity (Who, What, When, Where, Why):
Under current SPLC community centers and religious, civic and educarional institutions aze not allowed to place directional signs on
private property. This legislation allows these organizarions to place direcfional signs on rivo different arterial or collector s4eets
within 2,500 feet of the institution.
Advantages If Approved:
Disadvantapes If Approved:
Disadvantages If Not Approved:
�---- . . - -- - - -
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Total Amount of CostlRevenue Budgeted: � �
Transaction:
FundingSource: ActivityNumber. I�L o L+ qRe[
4! m bU�i:d�
Financial Information:
(Explain)
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Interdepartmentai Memorandum
CTTY OF SAII�IT PAUL
DATE: November 16, 2005
TO: AIl City Council members
Deguty City Attorney Hendrickson
Wendy Lane, Zoning Administrator
Lany Soderhoim, Planning Administrator
FROM: Peter W. Wamer, CAO
RE: Council File No. OS-633
COUNCIL REOUEST FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS
At the November 2, 2005 Council memberBenanav requested additional legal analysis of aproposal
under Council File No. OS-633 to amendL.eg. Code § 64.401(j) by adding additional language which
would pernut the placement of signs on private property which provides directions to community
centers, religious and educarional institufions. The question asked was why the City could permit
direc6onal signs for these uses when other City regulations restricted other types of signs including
an outright ban on off-premises advertising signs.
The purpose of this memo is to explain the legal basis for a proposed regulation that would pernut
"direcfional" signage for community centers, religious and educational institutions when other City
regulations restrict or prohibit other types of signs. It is heipful to understand this basis by revisiting
the legal foundations that permit the City to regulate signs in the first place.
LEGALBACKGROUND
In order to understand the somewhat complicated legal history surrounding the regulation of signs
and upholding the right of the government to unpose restricrions on land use through zoning
ordinances, it is helpful to examine certain basic legal precepts and some of the more important cases
that have examined and interpreted the permissible extent of sign regulations. The following
paragraphs are offered to explain why the City may enact a regulafion which would pernrit
directional signs for community centers, religious and educafional institutions
AA-ADA-EEO Employer
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Memo RE: C.F. No. OS-533
November 16, 2005
Page two
All sign regulations must start with this clause from the First Amendment to the Constitution which
provide�flrar "Corigress s3�atY matce no Yaw ..—: a�ridging fhe fteedom of speecri. �:." - This so "
called "Freedom of Speech" clause is, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to all state,
county, and city laws and ordinances dealing with "speech" issues including the City of Saint Paul.
The freedom of speech clause is intended to place limitarions on the scope of govemment authority
to regulate speech. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Generally, but not exclusively, freedom
of speech means that the "government has no power to restrict expression based upon its mess¢ge,
its ideas, its subject maner, or its content." Police Department of the C� of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (my italics added for emphasis). '
Although the First Amendment generally prevents a govemment from regulafing the message, idea,
subject matter or content of speech, the courts have interpreted the First Amendment so as to allow
a govemment to have some authority to impose certain regulations on speech provided that the
regulations aze intended to further important non-speech interests. Ward v. Rock Against Racisim,
491 U.S. 781 (1989). As long as the regulations are intended to simply regulate where and when
speech can occur so as not to interfere with other important state interests, and are not attempts to
suppress speech based upon its message, idea, subject matter or content, the validity of the
regulations may be upheld. Heffron v. International Societv of Krishna Consciousness. Inc., 452
U.S. 640 (1981).
An example of this is found in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters. Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), where
the Supreme Court held that the government could single out a form of speech - in that case"adult"
speech - for more reshictive treatment because the "adult theaters" and that speech disseminated
there were found by the City of Renton to generate distinct, non-communicative "secondary effects"
which the City of Renton could attempt to regulate through various regulations commonly lmo�vn
as time, place, and manner regularions.
Although the First Amendment generaily prohibits the government from regulating speech based
upon its content, the state of the law has evolved so that it is constitutionally pemussible to create
distinctions between some forms of speech_ For instance, in Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9
(1979) the Supreme Court held that is was permissible to create a distinction in the law between the
regu2ation of "commerciat" and "noncommercial speech." The Supreme Court found that
regularions on the time, place, or manner of expression of commercial speech are permissible
provided that the regulations "aze justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
that they serve a significant govemmental interest, and in so doing the leave open ample alternative
channels of communication of the information." �
AA-ADA-EEO Employer
05-l� 33
Memo RE: C.F. No. 05-533
November 16, 2005
Pagethree
In determining whether an ordinance is content-based or content-neutral, "[t]he principal inquiry
... Is whether the govemment has adopted a regularion of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys." Ward, Id. 491 U.S. at 791. In addition, the Supreme Court has aiso held that
an ordinance is not an impermissibie content-based ordinance simply because a government ofFcial
must examine the content of a sib in order to deternune which provision of an ordinance applies.
Hill v. Colorado, 530 TI.S. 703, 719-721 (2000).
One year after the Supreme Court's decision in Friedman v. Ro� which recognized a pernrissible
distincrion between commercial and noncommercial speech, the Supreme Court, in Central Hudson
Gas and Electric Cor�oration v Public Service Commission of N Y, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), held that
the United States Constitution "accords lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guazanteed expression." Id., at 562. The Central Hudson case indolved an
ordinance that completely banned promotional advertising by electric utility companies. The utility
companies in Central Hudson challenged the constitutionality of the ban azguing that it
impern restrained commercial speech based upon its content in violation of the First
Amendment.
In CenYral Hudson, the Supreme Court formulated the following four-part test to agply to content-
based commercial speech regulations in order to detennine whether the content-based restricflons
wouldpass consfitutional muster: First, commercial speech can enjoy constitutional protection only
if it is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity. Second, the government interest in
regulating the commercial speech must be substantial. If the first two questions are answered
�rmatively, the following question must be answered. Third does the regulation directly advance
the governmental interest asserted. Fourth, is the regulation no more extensive than necessary to
serve the governmenYs purpose. 447 U.S. at 566. Although the fourth prong of the Central Hudson
test was subseguently modified in Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v Fox, 492
U.S. 469 (1989) where the Court held that the government may regulate commercial speech without
showing that its regulation meets a"least restrictive" analysis. The CentraI Hudson tests, as modified
inFox,remainthestandazdforexaminingcontent-basedcommercialspeechregulations. UnderFox
the Supreme Court required a"fiY' that was "nazrowly tailored" to meet substantial government
goals. 492 U.S. at 480.
On a parallel with the First Amendment cases dealing with the regulation of commercial speech is
the long line of cases beginning with Villaee of Euclid v. Ambler Realt� o., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
which recognize and pemut the government to use its "police power" to pass regulations designed
to protect health, safery and general welfare of the public in the form of zoning ordinances. These
zoning cases stand for the basic proposition that, so long as a zoning ordinance does not constitute
a deprivation of life, liberty orproperty without due process, regulations under the zoning ordinance
will be upheld as a valid exercise of government police power.
AA-ADA-EEO Employer
05- !� 33
Memo RE: C.F. No. OS-533
November 16, 2005
Page four
In Berman v. Pazker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), the "public welfare" enforceable through the exercise of
police power was expanded to include the notion that "aesthetics" was a legitimate police power
goat. 'Fite$erman court heldthatvataesrepresented bythe pnbficwetfaze"are spuitual asa welras -
physical, aestheric as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to deternune that the
community should be beauriful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well balanced as well
as carefully patrolled." Id., at 33.
In City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the regulation of signs
"pose distinctive problems" that have long been subjected to "police powers" of states and cities.
That is because sig�s "take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, displace alternative
uses for land, and pose other problems that legitimately call for regulafion. Id., at 48. "It thus is
`common ground that governments may regulate the physical characterisfics' of signs and billboards
in much the same way that `they can, within reasonable bounds and absent censorial purpose,
regulate audible expression in its capacity as noise."' Prime Media. Inc. v. City of Brentwood.
Tennessee, 398 F3d 814, 818 (6`� Cir. 2005) (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994)).
The clash of aesthetic zoning ordinances enacted under the police powers against the rights of
comu�ercial speech in the form of advertising and business signs pmtected by the First Amendment
are difficult to sort out. The Supreme Court's leading decision on regulating advertising signs is
Metromedia. Inc. v. CiTy of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) a case which produced 5 sepazate
opinions with no opinion gaining a majority. The decision was crafted into a glurality by Justice
White. The plurality was referred to as "a virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definitive
principles can beclearly drawn." Id., at 569 (Rehnquist, 7_, dissenting).
The Metromedia plurality adopted the Central Hudson the four-part test noted abova as the
appropriate standard of review for content-based ordinances regularing billboards. Using Central
Hudson's four part test, the Metromedia court held that the City of San Diego's ban on off site
commercial advertising (billboards) did not improperly burden the contenY of commercial speech.
"Thus, offsite commercial billboazds may be prohibited while onsite commercial billboazds aze
permitted." 453 U.S. at 512, 101 S. Ct. at 2895.
These cases form the foundation for the legal reasomng that has permitted the City to enact Leg_
Code § 64.420 which prohibited off premises advertising signs, enact ordinances that distinguish off
premises advertising signs from on premise business signs and enact ordinances that impose the
variety of time, place and manner restrictions unposed on signs tlu L,eg. Code Chap. 64.
LEGAL BACKGROIIND APPLIED TO PROPOSAL TO AMEND LEG CODE & 64 401( Tl
The cases noted above provide the City with a legal basis to make a policy determinarion that it may
be in the public's interest, to fiuther a public purpose, by allowing directional signs for community
centers, religious and educarional instituUons.
AA-ADA-EEO Employa
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Memo RE: C.F. No. OS-533
November 16, 2005
Page five
It has been represented that many community centers, religious and educational institutions aze not
located on the principal streets and avenues of the City. In fact, we know that many community
centers, religious and educational insriturions aze located in residential neighborhoods well away
from the City's principal streets and avenues.
From a zoning-use perspecrive, community centers, religious and educational insritutions are, with
very rare exceprion, permitted uses in the City's residential neighborhoods. In contrast,
commerciaUindustrial uses aze not pernutted in residential neighborhoods. And, if these
commerciaUindustrial uses are located in residenrial neighborhoods; they are often nonconfornung
uses. Given that community centers, religious and educational institutions aze permitted,
noncommercial uses often located in residential neighborhoods away from the principal streets and
avennes of the City, it would be a reasonable public purpose policy decision, that would further the
public's interest, by pernutting directional signs for these uses while at the same time not permitting
similaz directional signs for commerciaUindustrial uses.
It might be advisable to augment what pubiic purposes aze intended to be furthered by the proposed
amendment to Lzg. Code § 64.401(j). This would help establish a legislative record or statement of
intent iilustrating the policybehind the regulations. For instance, the state of Minnesota has number
of directional sign regulations thatpernut directiorial signs forcertain uses. Examples include Minn.
Stat. § 160.283, Subd.l which sets forth a legislative f'inding of public purpose for aliowing ``resort
information signs" as an example of an exception to the state's regulations imposed on outdoor
advertising signs alongside segments of the state's highways, Minn. Stat. § 160.293 which permits
"specific service signs" alongside "nonfreeway trunk highways in rural areas" for a"place of
worship," and Minn. Stat. § 173.08, Subd.l (6) which exempts signs related to a"service club and
religious notices," which are defined in Minn. Stat. § 173 ; 02, Subd.6(c) as signs relating to
"meetings and locafion of nonprofit service clubs or charitable associations or religious services."
Planning staff of the planning commission could be consulted to provide this additional information.
PW W
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