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254324 OR161NAL TO CITY CL6RK �O ��24 ' CITY OF ST. PAUL couNCa c. 4 � � � �' FFICE OF THE CITY CLERK F`� L RF�$OLUTION—GENERAL FORM PRESENTED BY COMMISSIONE AT� r W�EitEAS, a �a6staintfal nEOt6er of the cittze�a of the Cfty af Satnt Paut hare b� peacrt�t �eaas e�cpressed thetr oppoaT�ior� to the partictp�tion of {�n�ted Sta�es �tZ#tary forces i'n Southeast Asi'a; znd i�ERF.�IS. the Co�r�c�t of t�.e C�"�jr of Sa�fnt Paa� ff�ds it apprc-� prtate ta reflect t�ts e�cpresst�e� of co�ncern on Behatf of satd cttt=ens and tfle Counct�, NoMt. Ther�efe►re, be �t RESQLYEt1, That tb�e Coanctt of t�h�e C�ty► of Safint Paul �tereDr records #t.� express�`oa of oppasttioq t� t�e ce�tf�ed firRpolv�nt of t�n�ted 5tates a��`Zftary forces tn Sewt�ea�t As�a! a�d � tt FE�tTt�R R�SCLYE�, Thit the Ci��tar Clerk �e and fs �erep�► directed t�► farward cap�es 0#' thts Resolntios � �resfide�t R#cl�a�d h!. K�xon, Sena�tor� N�t t� �. Mondat e a�d t�bert N. E�nP�'4Y. and �o aT t a�ab�s of t.�e Mtanesota Co�gressi�onal Detegatton. . ` t- :� � J W r- � � � � � � � U a n � o` U g . � � � o Q � COUNCILMEN Adopted by the Councii '�N 1 �97� 19— Yeas Nays Butler . ,�UN 11971 Carlson rove 19— Levine 7n Favor Meredith Sprafka � Tedesco A8'��st Mr. Preaident, McCarty ��N 51971 PUBLISHED ---'` �� J � .• ��. � � � C�FFI�� .�.i � €�`.�-.� �,,��::-;� ,��-:,t��L.�� ;'>f SAlNT P�,UL !:° �V�,��:r,��;,�?A 5,102 ,�. ; 1i3J'Ci;i r' 1,ALL �� a , - � • �r � � �°'s �:-!, i..rJU NIcK�NNA � �-- -_- -�=-.�:— G. THOMAS OSTHC'aFr City Comptroller Deputy City Comptrcile:r Ma� 25, 1971 Honorable Mayor, Charles P, rlcCarty and Members of the City Council This last Sunday, May 23, I had the pleasure of attending a rally for peace at the Metropolitan Sports Center, Although I nave attended peace ra].lies in the past, this one proved to be a particularly moving e�perience for me, And upon reflection, I think the significant fact of this event was the . diversity of the crowd which attended, Young and old, rich and poor, blacic and white --- they �aere all there. As I looked about the vast expanse of the Sports Center, 20,000 strong, I reali_zed that a tremendous experience in the democratic process was taking . place, This coas ari experience second only to an actual election. tdutchirLg izidzviduals participate in the democratic process is a wonderful thing, but I am reminded that the process is also open to units of local p;ovcYrune�t, Since local government is that unit of government which i_s closesL to the people, it may more accurately reflect the wishes of the peop�e. Theref�re, we have not only an opportuni_ty, but an obligation to express ourselves on the matters of war and peace. And since this expres- sion would be entirely appr.opriate and in keeping with the best c.raditioz of a small unit of government e�pressing itself to a larger unit of gcvern�- ment, I 'sugg�st that our city council go on record as favoring an end to the war na�a and that this sentiment be forwarded to the Congressman of the 4th District, our two U�ited States Senators, and the President of the Uni�ed States, Sincerely,` �`°-� �.��°"' � �'��. `�i�(��'� � �'" r LoL ticF�enna City Comptroller �.-.�-.. JOSEPH E. KARTH F" COMMIT7EE ON 4rN D�arwcr,M�Nr�eaar� SCIENCE ANO ASTRONAUTICS CHAIRMAN,SUBCOMMI7TEE ON E4HZ RAYBURN HOU3H OFPICE BUILDING SPACE SCIENCE AND CArrto�5-6631 �or�gre�� of t�je �t�iteb �tate� SUBCAMMnl7'1'EE ON ROBERT E.HESS NASA OYERS16H1' ^°M�,�,r°E,�g,�,� �ou�e of �.i.e�re�entatibe� COMMITTEE ON ��A�`I`gLOIT�� FiOJ�J MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERtEB SUBCOMMITiEfi ON FlSHERIES AND WILDLIFS CONSERVATION BUBCOMMI7TEE�N June 4 1971 OCEAN06RAPHY � SU6COMM17TEE ON PANAMA CANAL Mr. Harry E. Marshall City Clerk City of Saint Paul 386 City xall Saint Paul, Minnesota 55102 Dear Mr. Maxshall: Thank you for indicating to me your opposition to the wax in Vietnam and urging immediate withdrawal. You will be pleased to know that it was 3ust four years ago that I first publicly advocated the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. I have constantly since then tried to get first the Johnson Adminis- tration and then the Nixon Administration to end our armed intervention in Southeast Asia. I am takiug the liberty of enclosing a reprint of an article from the St. Paul Pioneer Press of March 6, 1971 Which summaxizes uQr position on this crucial issue. You will note in the interview that I expressed the wish we withdraw from Vietnam possibly by the end of the year. To this end I will support amendments to pending legislation which will bring the war to a conclusion. I appreciate knowing your views and also giving me the opportunity to present mine. With best wishes, I am Sincerely yours, � Josep E. arth . Memb of Congress /bl Enclosure / i BILL FRENZEL a/' c"'��"^T�: TNIRD DISTRICT,MINNESOTA BANKING AND CURRENCY HOUSE ADMINISTRATION v WASHINGTON OFFIC6: �7'j$LONGWORTHBUILDIN6 �o�gre�� of t�je ��iteb �tate� DISTRICTOFPICESS •j02-•u•e.�-Za7� 120 U.S.COURTHOUSB MINNEAPOLIS.MINNESOTA S$AO1 ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR �ouge of �.e�regetttatibe� 612-724-2179 DAVID N.KROGSEN6 5219 WAVUTA BoULevARD EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR a��irig�on,�.�. 20515 �.�,s 6 2��'�s�A g�,e RICHARD D.WILLOW DISTRICT MANAGER3: MRS.MAYBETH CHRISTENSEN June 1Q� 1971 MISS SANDRA KLU6 Honorable Members of the St. Paul City Council 386 City Hall St. Paul, Minnesota 55102 Dear Council Members: Thank you for your recent letter expressin� concern with present US Southeast Asia policy. As you perhaps know, I have signed the Mosher Statement callinR for an end to our involvement in Southeast Asia by December 31, 1971. To support the intent of this Statement, I intend to vote for the Nedzi-Whalen amend- ment to end further funding of the Viet Nam war as of December 31, 1971. I appreciate hearing from you and the many other constituents who have written on this issue and intend to do whatever I can to bring our involvement to a quick end. Yours very truly, � �� Bill Frenzel Nlember of Conp,ress BF:pce BOB BE�2GLAND WASfiINGTON OFFICE: 7rti D�srrticT, M�N�so7A 1008 Lor+�woR'rrt HOB WASHINGTON.D.C. ?AS18 Te�rxo�:(202)22�2168 Y COMMITTEE: AGRICULTURE �o�gre�� of t�e ��iteb �ta�te� DISTRIGT OFFICE: 9YO PSTH AVENUE SOIlrN �ouge of �e�re�etttatibeg MOORHEAD�MINNESOTA 56�0 T�PNONE:(202)236-SOSO �a��jf�tgtot�, �.(�. 20515 June 8, 1971 Mr. Harry E. Marshall City Clerk 386 City Hall St. Paul, Minnesota 55102 Dear Mr. Marshall: My thanks for sharing with me your view of our tragic involvement in Southeast Asia. I am firmly committed to our getting out of Vietnam. I will without hesitation speak out at thos� times when I think the Administration is hedging on its stated aim to do so and support wholeheartedly legislation designed to effectively bring about peace. I have co-sponsored the Vietnam Disengagement Act of 1971 and a number of other measures on this subject. I can assure you of my support in the future for such efforts. y>.�incerely yours, �� , �F ...,. � BOB B BB;bes ANCHFTR NELSEN COMMITTEES: HUTCMINSON.MINNESOTA INiER3TATE AND FOREION COMMERCE DISTRICT OF GOWMBIA 2a D�srrnct Courrr�es: BLUE EARTH MURRAY �o�gre�� ot t�je ��citeb �ta�te� OFFICE: BROWN NICOLLET ROOM 2929 CARVER NOBLES COTTONWOOD PIPESTONE RAI7URN OPPICE BUILDIN6 FARIBAULT ROCK �pUgE Df �E�I�E�EritAttbCg TELEPHONE:22$-2472 JACKSON BCOTT LeSUEUR SIBLEY ' MCLEOD WASECA ri F /�► MARTIN WATONWAN ��is`�LOtt� ��Ij� 20515 June 9, 1971 Mr. Harry E. Marshall City Clerk Bureau of Records 386 City Hall St. Paul, Minnesota 55102 Dear Mr. Marshall: Thank you for sending me the copy of the resolution con- cerning American participation in the Indochina war, which was adopted by the St. Paut City Couneil on June lst. Please con- vey to the members of the Council my thanks for taking time to express their views on behalf of their constituency about this tragic conflict. Their concern, and yours, is appreciated. Kindest regards. Sincerely yo s, n her Nelsen Member of Congress AN:ef ' ALBERT H.QUIE COUNTIES: � isi DISTR�ci,MIMNESOTA DAKOTA MOWER � DODCiE OLMSTED ` FILLMORE RICE COMMITTEE: � FREEBORN STFFI C EDUCATION AND LABOR �o�g�re�� o� t�je ��fte�► �tate� HOU TON WINONAA WASHIN6TON OFFICE: 2HS�}RAYBURN HOUSE OFPIC6 BUILDINO �ou�e of �e�re�entaribe� ROCHESTER OFFIC� 202-22l�2271 4S6 F�ns7 NwTtowu.Bnrnc Bun.ouro 507-288-2984 �a��jingtott,�.f�. 20515 June 7, 1971 Mr. Harry E. Marshall City Clerk 386 City Hall St. Paul, Minnesota 55102 Dear Mr. Marshall: Thank you for your message eonveying the St. Paul City Council's opposition to the war in SoutheasC Asia. My position on withdrawal from Vietnam is quite clearly and fully set forth in my latest newsletter, which I am enclosing for your consideration. Although I do believe that the rate of withdrawal should be speeded up and that the President should set a withdrawal date, I have been reluctant to vote for a legislative timetable for withdrawal, as is explained in the newsletter. With every good wish, I am Sincerely� � ;` ' /_. G'L__� ERT H. QUIE Member o£ Cangress AHQ/mlk Congressman � ;a �- � �;.. �� _ � � � , ° ,'„�,"�r e= r . .= e e � e . � REPORTS ' INOT PRINTED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE� �� jU May 27, 1971 VIETNAM WASHINGTON---1lietnam continues to be the No, 1 concern of the Nation. To date, the intransigence o£ Hanoi and the National Liberation Front (NLF) continues. Here is the comparison between the proposals of the two sides at the Paris peace talks. Hanoi and the NLF have demanded: 1. The United States Government must (a) stop "Vietnamization" and (b) totally with- draw all troops, military personnel, wa.r materials and weapons from South Vietnam and dismantle all U.S, military bases without posing any condition whatsoever; 2. In case the United States Government declares it will withdraw by June 30, 1971, (later they agreed to '�examine a different reasonable deadline") they will refrain £rom attacking the withdrawing troops and engage in discussions (a) on the question of insuring safety for the total withdrawal and (b) the question of releasing POW�s; and 3. Thieu, Ky and Khiem, the President, Vice President and Prime Minister of South Vietnam, must be dropped from the South Vietnam Government and be replaced by a coalition government made up of persons from (a) the Provisional Revolutionary Government, (b) persons of the Saigon Administration who "really stand for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy,'° and (c) others of various political and �� •ssaa�uo� ut a.zauMOU �uzo� aq o�. s.z�add� ��uz.zEus anua�a.z TEan.z ao� I�sodozd au�. axii `�I '�it�u$?� asoddo o� pa��adxa aq uE� uauczi�u� .zza��. u�zuM a�ou� � `saa��tunuo�qns uot�.�z.zdoaddd i�.zn�.in�z.z�y pu� saa�.�zunuo� a.zn�.in�z.z�y a�.�uas pu� asnoH au� �o pua au� aq �u�tu� osT� �.I •u�u�saxods janaj-�auiq�� E �o unu �uz�z.zdap �Cq a�zon s,aaw.ze� au� a�.nTtp pinoM �z a�a� sn �o �Cu�cu °papaau sz dipa�.qnopun �uzi� -�nusaa au�os pu� Z98I ui paur.zo� sEM �.z a�uts �.uau��.z�dap au� �o uoz�.�zzuE�aoa.z .zof�eu� �e uaaq �,us�eq a.zau�. �{�nou�.Iy •s�.uau��.z�dap Mau .zno� o�. wau�. u�zss� pu� suoi�.�un� pa��ja.z o�. �uzp.zo�� sai�ua�� uam�.zEdaQ a.zn�jn�z.z�y dn �.tTds pinoM �.I •jesodo,zd uoz��zzu��aoaa �uau�u.zano� au�. sz apzs�C,z�.uno� au� pu� ssaa�uo� aq�. u�.oq uz dTToo� panta�a.z uaaq seu u�?u�y a.zn�.in�t.z�� ao� ur�,z�o.zd s,�.uapzsaad au�. �o �.a�d aup •uoz�.�n�zs s,aaw.z�e� au�. �o �uzpuE�.saapun .za��a.z� a�np -o.zd o�. pat.z�. an��{ s.zaq�uaw .Cu�iu `.zooj� asnoH au� uo umao3 u�zE3 �Ic��uotu � �o su�auc .Cg •ssa.z�uo� au� ut su�alqo.zd iu.ze� �o ssauaaeM� pas�a.z�ui u� .�q pazu�du�o�� a.z� C'1 TATT'� '�C',iiT 'Tl',ll7i'DfTV', '�/l TTTM 11CTt� C7Ii�'1C.�C T^�M!1C tliTV T��IUM Tt�TnT TAT Cfi»nT TnTnC _ 4 _ _ _. REDISTRICTING Changes in district boundaries for the 1972 elections will mean the inclusion of 82,000 people in Washington County in the First District and the loss of 130,000 people in Mower, Freeborn and part of Dakota Counties whom I have had the privilege of .r_epresenting for years. I very much regret the loss of any of my present constituency, and especially the loss of a large numher since new area was added to the District; however, I recognize the responsibility is in the hands of the Legislature and the Governor. Theoretically, each constituent is under-represented when the population of a Member's district gets too far out of line. The Legislature found it a difficult task to redraw the lines of the eight Congressional districts to put the population of each near the ideal of 475,600 persons. It looks like we will have to accept this in as good grace as possible. The Third District, represented by Representative William Frenzel, had a 52.6 per cent population increase during the past 10 years, bringing it to 680,236 persons. That compares with 375,180 in Representative Bob Bergland's Seventh District. The First, Third and Fourth Districts are too large and Bistricts Two, Five, Six, Seven and Eight are too small. *****�** FARM PROGRESS The farmer's problems are receiving new attention in Washington because of President Nixon's recent recommendations. Gretchen and I were present for the Salute to Agriculture Day activities at the White House which capped a week-long series of events drawing attention to the successes and problems of the farmer. President Nixon started it off by paying tribute to the productive capacity of the American farmer, In a radio message, he noted that, while some countries cannot even produce enough to feed their own people, the situation is just the reverse in America. Our farmers not only make us the best fed and best clothed people in the world, but also help to feed people of other lands. The production from one acre out of every four harvested in America is exported -- including more than half of our soybean and �rheat crops. Export volume of farm products is expected to reach $7.4 billion this year. Not satisfied, the President set a goal of $10 billion annually and increased the budget of the Foreign Agricultural Service by $1 million to help achieve it. To spur better hog prices, the Administration will continue the pork-buying program under which 145 million pounds have been bought for the food distribution and school lunch programs since last fall. To help farmers cope with inflation and rising costs, the President has asked Congress for authority to expand Farmers Home Administration loan power, By letting FHA insure private operating loans as it does oc+mers�iip loans, the supply of farm credit could be dramatically increased. He also directed FHA to increase availability of insured ownership loans from $210 million to $350 million a year. There will be an increased onslaught against crop, plant and livestock dis- eas�� and increased budget requests for soil and water conservation assistance. In- �._ I r, DOM�LD M.FRASER FOREIGNAFFAIRSCOMMITTEE S�IbTRICT,MINNESOTA ' SUBCAMMITTEESs S$Z HWSE OFFICE BUILDIN6 STAT6 DEPARTMENT ORGANIZA'ryON AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS ��-'��-47SS �ot�cgre�� of t�je �t�iteb �tate� ��'�TERNATIONAL�R6ANIZATIONS DALE MwCIVER AND MONEMENTS _ ADMINISTRATNE ASSISTANT �ou�e of �t.e�re�etttatibe� NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND $CIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS ��`�qW��7�•�� 20515 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COM M ITTEE 1111 Longworth June 15 , 1971 T��r . Harry E , hiarshall City Clerk and Commissioner of Registration Bureau of Records 386 City Iiall St . Paul , Minnesota 55102 Dear 'r�lr. Marshall : Thank you for writing about the tragic Indochina t�Tar. The enclosures indicate some of the efforts I am involved in to help bring American participation in the war to an early end. The strong anti-war sentiments of the American People are affecting the Congress . jVe must , therefore , continue our efforts . I am committed to continue and, whenever possible , to intensify my efforts to end our involvement in this war as quickly as possible . �+Tith bes t wishes . _.�-- ;„~, -°" ��ice r y , � ��.._ _... �`�.� t2 r�.-�- D.vfiald M. Fraser �- Enc 1. .r- � (NOT PRINTED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE) �� /� LTIIILEd .SLSLES 01 America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THB 9 j st C�NGRBSS, SECOND SBSSION Vol. 116 WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 8, t970 No. 177 House o Re resent�tives .� HOI�. DONALD M. FRASER It also seeks to obta�n the return oi v�etnam.Day in and day out I am asked American prisoners of war in Vietnam. by my constituenta,"What are you do1n8 OF 1[INN$80TA Mr, Chairman, since this emendment �o bring�American involvement to an IN THE HOU3E OF REPRE$ENTATIVffi'3 qtAg $Pgti (11gCU88C(�, I think it is fair to end?"I have to answer that there is only acknowledge that the public concern has one power in the House,really,with re- THE AMENDMENT TO END �nished. In the light of the Presi- sP�t to the continuation oY oUr lt�volve- THE WAR dent's address to the American people ment, and that is over �he funding of last ttight>it could be axgued that this is the milftary operations in Vietnam itself. eaa�xnnaarrr osrsa�a sY MR. lRABER not a timely proposal to submit to the 'Phat !s why tt�fs ameadmeat becomes Mr.FRASER.Mr.Cha3rman,I oPPer an House. I do not want to be a critic oP the appmA�ate vehicle to say that the amendment. what the President had to s�a,y last night. time ha+s co�me Por the IInited 6tates ta The Clerk read as follows• �what he had to say makes the flicker- reco8alze that whether we stay there an- emenctmeat offerea by Mr. Fhe�sEe: On. �g light of the candle which shows the other 12 months or 24 months or 48 page a5, aftea�iine 8,insert tne iouowing: �ay to peace a little stronger, I am 100 months the outcome in Vietnam is very ••sEC. s4s. �a> xone oi tx�e runas appra- pQrcent in support oY that e8ort. lik�ly to be the same. We cannot write prta,tea by t�u8 Aat sna11 be wsea to anan�e There are many uncertaintles about the future hisCory oP Vietnam.That has in euy ma,nner whsteoever any comba,t oa� what the President had to sa�y last night. bo be settled by the Vletnamese them- aupport operstaoms by any Unitea stat� There are many unanswered questions, selves. srmea torce in vte�taam attier tt�au t�e questi�ns which may be explored and I So I urge support of an amendment auah opercauona wnict�are aeceesary to carry $epe will be expinrzd at the negotiating which says the time has come for the out the sate ana arae�ly wttnarawal 02 �,ble. IInited States to begin an orderly and Umtea e�tatea io�ces ana Unitea Statea gut one thing the President calle�d for safe withdrawal of its forces and to leave prfaoaers oi war irom pietnam: ProviBed, �� e negotiation oP the withdrawal to tlie Vietnamese the settlement of the That Che issads n�bt eapended a� obl�gated �u��,e y��,�� of American trobps from Vietnam. Why future of their nation. �ectton shau nat be atherw�se ezpenaed or should the United States negotiate for ��Be�- the wlthdrawal of American troaps? °(b) xotwl,tbatandtng auy atl�er pmvis�ans What aceountability do we have to Hanoi The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The od m�s Act, nome c�t1�e tunas epproprtated when we decide the time has came Par Chair reco6nizes the gentleman from by this Act sba11 be avauabie roa� eapeacu- the IInited States tn disengage from this Minnesota (Mr. Fnnsaa). ture naa� eha11 be obl�gaated for eapenfliture �tly,this ghastly mistake,perhaps one Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I think atter duae as, 19T1 to Snance IInited Swatee af the most serious mista,kes in Ameri- it ought to be perfectly clear from the military per�onaei, ather than advisoxs, in vietnam: provtdea, Tna�t tlie funds nat es- can foreign policy? wording of the amendment that it would penaea aa� obugatea t�ecause o2 t1�e iimtta- The IInited States ha,s been in Viet- authoriae such operations which are tfons containea in t1�a eecraon a1�au nat be nam longer than it l�as fought in any necessary to carry out the saPe and or- otnerwlse expendea or ot�ugatea:' other w�ar. The lives lost, the casualties derly withdrawal of II.S. forces. Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, this is s�ered,the billions expended are known This leaves it up to the President. Ali the amendment which, in effect, would � every Member of this Chamber. we are askinB is tliat he establish a carry out the intent of H.R. 1000. It is I frankly do not have confldence in schedule to brine the troops out by the similar in its thrust to the so-called Hat- the possibility of a negotiated political end of the 8sca1 year. Seld-McC3overn amendment in its ea.rlier �ttlement to end American involvement If we propose to stay fn Vietnam and form, which was discussed in the other �that war.I hape I am wrong.One has deal from strength, we are not Boing to body. td reeognize the nature of this war—to accomplish that either under the Presf- What this amendment would d'o,if ac- embrace fully the realities—before one dent°s noiicy, as it has been Pollowed in cepted by the Congress,is to provide that can claim with any force or any convic- the past or under the President's policy, money for flscal year 1971 could only be ��n that a political settlement is in fact as it was enunciated last night. spent for the safe and orderly with- a likely way to terminate that war. The President is takfng aome troops drawal oi a11 U.S. forces from Vietnam, Hexe we have the apprapriation bill, �ut,but I think what we need to do is to with the wi�thdrawal to be completed by which is the �ugular vein supplying the set a schedule and be sure that we get the end of the 8scal year. money that keeps American troops in out within a rerasonabFe tia4e. . ��D CONGRESS �. �0 7 726 1sT SESSZOx IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Ar�tiL 26,1�J71 �Ir. Rr,r��rtiix (for himself, Mr. BERGLnNn,Mr. FnASFx, �nd Mx•. KAR�x) intro- duced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 2ffairs A BILI� T�o� ��men!d th�e� I'�or�Y�gn. A��s�s�is��an��ce A�ct o�f 1961, �a�s� �,�m�en�d�e�d. 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and I�ouse o f Re,roresenta- 2 tives o f the United States o f America in Con,qress assembled, 3 Thtit this Ac�t m��,y be cited as the "V�etnam Disengagement 4 Act of 1971.". 5 ��EC. 2. Congress finds and declares that under the 6 Constitntion of the United S�ates the President and the Con- 7 gress sha.re responsibility for establishing, defining tlie 8 a,uthorit;y for, and concluding forei�ii mil2t�ry commitments; 9 th�i,t the r�e�p�e�a1 Qf t�h�e G��tll:�f �o�f T'ankin �r�e�s�o�11at2�on ra�is�ers n�e�w 10 uncertainties a�bout the source of authority for American 11 irivolvern�nt in Vietnam; that both the dome'stic and foreign I , HOUSE DEMOCRATS CALL FOR CONTINUED ANTI-WAR EFFORTS March 31 , 1971 Thirty anti-war Democratic Congressmen today issued the following statement regarding the House Democratic Caucus action calling for an end to U. S. involvement in Indochina during the 92nd Congress : "While we share the disappointment expressed by some of our anti-war colleagues that the resolution calling for a December 31, 1971 end of U. S. involvement in Indochina did not prevail , we are pleased that the House Democratic Caucus has joined the Senate Democratic Caucus and the Democratic National Committee Policy Council in asserting opposition to the war and determination that we end all U . S . involvemGnt in Indochina during the 92nd Congress . In fact, we believ� the specific reference to ending involvement �during the 92nd Congresst makes the House Democratic resolution stronger than that adopted by our Senate colleagues a few weeks ago. IJonetheless , we intend to continue and whenever possible intensify our efforts to terminate this tragic war as quickly as possible. " Brock Adams Richard Fulton David R. Obey Les Aspin Sam Gibbons James G. 0 'Hara Jonathan B. Bingham Ella T. Grasso Thomas P. 0 'Nei11 ,Jr. Edward P. Boland Henry Helstoski Paul S. Sarbanes Frank J. Brasco Joseph E . Karth John F. Seiberling Phillip Burton Spark M. i�latsunaga James H. Scheuer John C . Culver Lloyd Meeds James V . Stanton Robert F. Drinan Abner J. Mikva James W. Symington Bob �ckhardt Parren J. Mitchell P�orris K. Udall Donald M. Fraser John E. Moss Sidney R. Yates ' � � � f'�.��,. - DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 June 16, 1971 Mr. Harry E. Marshall City Clerk 386 City Hall St. Paul, Minr Dear Mr. Mars' President Nix resolution pa the war in 5c One of the P � was to revie - Viet-Nam. � us on the rc `� � •. US forces . � � , program for � / — October 7, � peace whicl^ � side refuse �i� way, but wE G,� � our effort; Thus , the forces , br a precipitous , u��__ in light of our purpose in vi�� _.__ assist the South Vietnamese people to defena ��_.__ against aggression by North Viet-Nam. We came, at their request, to help them maintain their right to direct their own affairs free from external interference. This is what we are trying to achieve at the peace talks in Paris and on the ground in Viet-Nam. Increasing South Vietnamese military effectiveness enabled us to begin redeployment of our troops in mid-1969 . With- drawals proceeded on schedule, and on April 7, 1971 Pres- ident Nixon told the nation of his plans for the redeploy- ment from Viet-Nam of an additional 100 ,000 American troops to be completed by December l, 1971. This reduc- tion will bring the US troop ceiling in Viet-Nam down to 184, 000--about one-third of the 549 ,500 ceiling in June 1969 when the President ordered the initial redeployment. As the South Vietnamese assume more of the burden of battle, US casualties decline. In 1970 the number of Americans killed in action was the lowest in five years . ,:J - 2 - The success of our operation in Cambodia and the South Vietnamese operation in Laos assured the continuing pace of our withdrawal from Viet-Nam. I am enclosing statements about the war and the President' s initiatives for peace. I hope you will give these your full consideration. Perhaps you will then conclude as we do that the only real alternative for the United States is the fulfillment of our commitment to South Viet-Nam while pursuing our efforts to achieve a just and honorable peace. Sincerely yours, �J��„ � ' William D. Blair, Jr. Acting Assistant Secret ry for Public Affairs Enclosures. r��ac� = �� e��nr��a�a�r� �h' I �� BUR�,o,U of PUB�IC Q��QIR� UNITED STATES POSITION ON TROOP REPLACEMENT IN VIET-NAM On April 7, 1971 President Nixon announced his plan for the with- drawal from Viet-Nam of another 100,000 American troops , to be completed by December 1, 1971, Added to the previous withdrawals, this reduction will bring the US troop ceiling in Viet-Nam down to 184,000. The troop ceiling in June 1969, when the President ordered the initial withdrawal of US troops, was 549,500. Replace- ment of US forces by the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam (RVNAF) will have reduced the number of American troops in Viet- Nam by two-thirds by December 1, Reductions are carefully carried out so as not to endanger �ther American troops or those of our allieso The redeployment program, however, does not mean that US troops will no longer be sent to Viet-Namo The regular troop rotation system will continue to pro- vide men to take the place of individual servicemen who complete their one-year tour of duty in Viet-Namo Rate of Withdrawal Depends on President 's Criteria The rate of withdrawal �f our troops from Viet-Nam depends on the three criteria set by President Nixon when he first outlined his program for the redeployment of US forces ; progress in the train- ing and equipping of the South Vietnamese forces, progress in the Paris peace talks and the level of enemy activityo The latest de- cision was based entirely on the progress of Vietnamization, It �as made after consultation with US connnanders in the field and has the approval of the Government of Viet-Namm The timing and pace of the new withdrawals in the over-all schedule wi11 be deter- mined by our best judgment of the current military and diplomatic situationo The President has stressed that, as replacements of US forces take place, no actions will be taken which endanger the at- tainment of our objective, the right of self-determination for the people of South Viet-Namo Cambodia and Laos Operations Assure Continued T�lithdrawal In March and April of 1970, communist troops used their long-held bases in Cambodia to move against the Government of Cambodia in a way which increased the long-term threat to US and allied forces P - 437 Continued April 12, 1971 - 4 - , . Even if our proposals are rejected entirely, we will still main- tain our withdrawal policy as part of the Vietnamization pro- . gram, This would be the slowest of the three possibilities, but we would nevertheless continue withdrawing our forces as the South Vietnamese are able to assume an increasing share of their own defenseo US Proposals Consistent and Reasonable We believe that our proposals are consistent with our decision not to seek a military solution on the battlefieldo We are willing to withdraw our troops i.mmediately and simultaneously with the North Vietnameseo If Hanoi agrees, a relatively rapid end of the war is possiblem Hanoi's Demand for Unilateral US Withdrawal Unreasonable However, the other side, in the "ten points" of the National Lib- �ration Front (NLF), as well as in the essentially identical po- sition of its more recent "ei,ght points, " continues to demand that United States forces leave unconditionally while North Viet- namese forces stay to do as they pleaseo The intransigence of the .communist side convinced us that we had to take other posi- tive measures to lower the 1eve1 of violence in the conflict and to induce the other side to cooperate in bringing the war to an endo We therefore accelerated our program to build up the RVNAF so they could take over their cauntry's defenseo The continuing success of our program to further strengthen the RVNAF is putting Hanoi on notice, even as we bring our troops home, that our basic obj�ctive remains unchanged and that the cammunists have nothing to gain by persisting in their aggression against South Viet-Namo US Willing to Discuss Other Proposals On numerous occasions since May 1969, President Nixon has re- iterated our desire to bring about genuine negotiations in Paris. All of our proposals, public and private, remain on the confer- ence table to be exploredo In the final analysis, progress to- ward peace can be accelerated significantly if the other side is prepared to get down to practical negotiations on the basis of the President 's proposal outlined above� We and the Government of South Viet-Nam are prepared to discuss its details with the other sideo Our proposals are not offered on a take-it-or-leave- it basiso We are willing to talk abuut anybody's programs - Hanoi's four points, the NLF `s ten points -- provided it is con- sistent with our few basic and simple terms : mutual withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces from South Viet-Nam and free choice for the people of South Viet-Namo The long-term interests of peace require that we insist on no lessm P - 437 Apri1 12, 1971 �� aa�o�r��a�� o� BUR�,�U of PUB�IC Q��,�IRS PROGRESS OF THE E�RMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM The South Vietnamese -- both soldiers and civilians -- have amply demonstrated their willingness to fight and die for their freedom. For years they fought alone against the enemy before the arrival of allied forces, and they stretched their manpower and their economy to the limit. In terms of casualties and of manpower engaged in combat the South Vietnamese bear by far the heaviest load of the strugg�e. More than 131,350 South Vietnamese soldiers have been killed since the beginning of 1960. In every month of the war ex- cept one, more South Vietnamese soldiers have been killed in action than Americans. Over One Million South Vietnamese under Arms There are over 1,000,000 men in the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) which include the regular Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, as we11 as the Regional and Popular Forces. The sub- stantial number of inen in paramilitary and security forces such as the National Police, when added to RVNAF strength, bring the total of South Vietnamese under arms to more than 1,200,000. In other words, over one-half of the physically fit males between 15 and 49 years of age in areas under Government of Viet-Nam security are in uniform. A comparable percentage for the United States would mean over 15 million men in service -- more than were in the US Armed Forces during World War II. These figures do not include over 3,500,000 in the People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF) . Almost 2,500,000 PSDF personnel have received some military training and over 350,000 weapons have been issued to them. South Viet-Nam�s Draft Law South Viet-Nam has had for some years a draft 1aw similar to those in other countries. As in the United States, individuals may be exempted or deferred for mental or physical handicaps, studies or extreme hardship. On October 26, 1967 the Government issued a mobilization decree lowering the draft eligibility age to 18 ; draft- ing of eighteen-year-olds began in May 1968. The National Assembly passed a General Mobilization Law in June 1968 raising the upper limit for the draft to 38 and making all males between 16 and 50 subject to service in the RVNAF or the PSDF. About 70 per cent of the men who entered the RVNAF in 1967 and in 1968 were volunteers, and only about 30 per cent were draftees. In 1969 and 1970, about 85 per cent were volunteers. P - 412 Continued May 19, 1971 , - 4 - infiltration for attacks on the population centers around Saigon. These US forces led the drive into the '�Fishhook" area of Cambodia. Two months later the Americans pulled back to interior provinces, leaving the ARVN to guard the border. Since then enemy activity in that Region has dropped 50 per cent. In February 1971, same 17,000 AR.VN troops initiated a major drive into the Lao Panhandle to interdict NVA supplies moving down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. After two months of the hardest combat since the 1968 Tet offensive, against crack NVA troops, the ARVN units returned to South Viet-Nam, having killed 16,000 enemy, taken 167 prisoners, and captured or destroyed 100 tanks, 4,847 individual and 1,880 crew-served weapons as well as tons of ammunition, food, medicine and other supplies. This action disrupted Hanoi's supply channel to its forces in Cambodia and South Viet-Nam and demonstrat- ed the RVNAF 's ability to seize the initiative. It should contri- bute considerably to reducing enemy attacks in the coming months. RVNAF Do Increasing Share of Fighting While the fighting in Laos was going on, a much less publicized operation in the U-Minh Forest and the Seven Mountains area of the Delta was also showing the effectiveness of the RVNAF. Initiated in December 197(T; this operation has seen ARVN troops moving freely through areas which have been VC strongholds for years. No major set battles have taken place, but the ARVN has killed scores of the enemy almost daily while sustaining only light casualties. Their success is materially assisting the pacification effort in the De1ta. In the past the ARVN spent much time on hamlet and village security. Since mid-1969, the Regional and Popular Forces and the People's Se1f-Defense Forces have taken over more and more local security and pacification duties. For the most part the regular forces now concentrate on fighting enemy main force units. RVNAF progress en- abled President Nixon to reduce the number of US troops in Viet-Nam by 268,100 by April 30, 1971. Progress in training and equipping the RVNAF has substantially exceeded our expectations and very signi- ficant advances are being made in pacification. On this basis, the President has ordered another reduction of 100,000 US troops in Viet- Nam to be completed by December 1, 1971. Further redeployment of US troops depends on three criteria -- the increasing capabilities of the South Vietnamese to provide their own security, the level of NVA and VC activity in South Viet-Nam, and progress in the Paris peace talks, including the prisoners of war issue. The last two criteria hinge on the enemy's attitude and actions. RVNAF progress depends on the South Vietnamese spirit and continuing will to improve with our assistance. P - 412 May 19, 1971 _ _ PM o L��C� g � o��o�rn�`a�aow -.� �. .;: ��, �, �c��oc�� BUR�,o,U of PUB�IC Q��/�IR� THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN ASIA The United States role in Asia was defined by President Nixon in his report to the Congress of February 18, 1J70 on foreign affairs. Selected parts of the �Asia and the Pacific" section of this report, including the Nixon Doctrine , follow: "Wh.at we seek for Asia is a cammunity of free nations able to go their own way and seek their own destiny with whatever cooperation we can.provide -- a cammunity of independent Asian countries, each maintaining its own traditions and yet each develop- ing through mutual cooperation. In such an arrange- ment, we stand ready to play a responsible role in accordance with our cammitments and basic interests. " Statement by the President at Bangkok, Thailand, July 28, 1969 Three times in a single generation, Americans have been called upon to cross the Pacific and fight in Asia. No region of the world has more engaged our energies in the postwar period. No continent has changed more rapidly or with greater complexity since World War II. Nowhere has the failure to . create peace been more costly or led to greater sacrifice. America`s Asian policy for the 1970's must be based on the lessons of this sacrifice. Does it mean that the United States should withdraw fram Asian affairs? If not, does it mean that we are condemned to a recurring cycle of crisis and war in a changing setting beyond the understanding or influence of outsiders? Our answers to these questions provide the concepts behind this Administration's approach to Asia. First, we remain involved in Asia. We are a Pacific power. We have learned that peace for us is much less likely if--there is no peace in Asia. Second, behind the headlines of strife and turmoil, the fact remains that no region contains� a greater diversity of P - 444 continued February 20, 1970 - 4 - ' . . local self-reliance, and the threat turns out to have been more serious than we had judged, we will only have created still more dangerous choices. On the o�er hand, if we become unwisely involved, we risk stifling the local contri- bution which is the key to our long-run commaitment to Asia. -- The success of our Asian policy depends not only on the strength of our partnership wirh our Asian friends, but also on our relations with Mainland China and the Soviet Union. We have no desire to impose our own prescriptions for relationships in Asia. We have described in the Nixon Doctrine our conception of our relations with Asian nations. We hope that other great powers will act in a similar spirit and not seek hegemony. -- Just as we and our allies have an interest in averting great power daminance over Asia, we believe that peace in the world would be endangered by great power conflict there -- whether it involves us or not. This characterizes our at- titude towards the Sino-Soviet dispute. -- Asian regional cooperation is at its beginning. We will confront subtle decisions as we seek to help maintain its momentum without supplanting Asian direction of the effort. -- A sound relationship with Japan is crucial in our common ef- fort to secure peace, security, and a rising living standard in the Pacific area. We look forward to extending the co- operative relationship we deepened in 1969. But we shall not ask Japan to assvme responsibilities inconsistent with the deeply felt concerns of its people. -- In South Asia, our good relations with India and Pakzstan should not obscure the concrete dilemmas we will face. How can we bring home to both, for example, our serious concern over the waste of their limited resources in an arms race, yet recognize their legiti.mate interests in self-defense? All these issues will confront this Administration with vary- ing intensity over the coming years. We are planning now to meet challenges and anticipate crises. Our purpose in 1969 has been to make sure none was ignored or underestimated. The task ahead -- for Asians and Americans -- is to address all these issues with the imagination, realism and boldness their solutions demand if lasting peace is to come to Asia. P - 444 February 20, 1970 �U��B� ��'��N �� BUR�,�U of PUBI�IC Q��,�IRS : COMM[JNIST TERROR TACTICS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM All men of good will are strongly opposed to the violence in Viet-Nam. But this violence was generated by North Viet-Nam's aggression against the South. A principal weapon of this communist aggression is terrorist warfare aimed directly at the civilian population of South Viet-Nam. There is no moral justification for such savagery, as deliberate a reign of terror as that underlying the Nazi regime and other oppressive forces throughout history. Hanoi Directs Systematic Terror Those who argue that the United States should retreat from a confrontation with the North Vietnamese may not understand the scope the violence would attain if their aggression went unchecked. Since the mid-1950's, the North Vietnamese regime has directed the communist apparatus in the South in the brutal and calculated murders of thousands of teachers, village and hamlet officials, rural health workers and their families. The communists are trying to paralyze village and family life in South Viet-Nam and to subjugate the population. During the Tet offensive in 1968, communist troops from North Viet-Nam attempted a systematic purge of South Vietnamese families-- massacring at least 3,000 men, women and children in Hue alone, many of them tortured and buried alive. US Seeks to End the Violence At the Paris talks and before, the United States has consistently sought to end the violence in Viet-Nam. President Nixon's major new initiative for peace on October 7, 1970 called for an immediate end to the fighting which could be negotiated without pre-conditions. The President also proposed an Indochina peace conference, an agreement on a timetable for troop withdrawals, a search for a political settlement and the immediate release of all prisoners of war. All of our proposals, public and private, remain on the conference table to be e�lored, and our representatives are willing to talk about anybody's program provided it can be made consistent with our basic objective: the opportunity for full participation in the political life of South Viet-Nam by all political elements that are prepared to do so without the use of force or intimidation. The United States seeks no bases or military ties, it does not oppose neutrality or object to re- unification, and it is prepared to accept any government in South Viet-Nam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves. P-470 continued April 21, 19 71 - 4 - December 5, 1967 -- Viet Cong overran Dak Son hamlet in Phuec Long province near Cambodia. Using 60 flame throwers, they deliberately burned to death 252 civilians, two-thirds of them women and children. The enemy also abducted 200 civilians, who were never heard from again, and destroyed as much of the hamlet as they could before running out of flameth rower fuel. January-Februar 1968 -- In addition to the Hue massacre mentioned above, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong during the Tet offensive slaughtered thousands of civilians throughout Viet-Nam, often using women and children as shields during their attacks. June 29, 1968 -- Son Tra, a village in Quang Ngai province and the site of a Government socio-economic development program, was attacked by enemy forces in the early morning. Because of the program's success, the Viet Cong revenged themselves against innocent citizens for cooperating with the Government. They killed 88 civilians and wounded 103, put the torch to 570 houses, and left 2,800 people homeless. February 16, 1969 -- Communists occupied Phuoc My village, Quang Tin pro- vince, for several days. The survivors described a series of brutal acts: � a 78-year old villager shot for refusing to cut down a tree for a fortifica- tion; a 73-year old man killed when he could not or would not leave his home, pleading that he could not walk; an 11-year old boy stabbed; several families grenaded in their homes. February 1969 -- To discourage families from sending their children to school, the Viet Cong in the IV Corps area stopped a school bus, took off a little girl, and cut off her fingers. August 30, 1970 -- North Vietnamese sappers, using mortars, grenades and � plastic charges, attacked an undefended orphanage in Xuyen Phu. �aelve Vietnamese civilians were killed and 45 wounded, most of them children huddling beneath their beds. The orphanage was looted and the Buddhist monk operating it was executed. The sappers picked the orphanage over numerous military targets in the area, apparently to intimidate voters. September 10, 1970 -- Viet Cong terrorists shot a prominent Chinese high school principal and political leader as he walked into his office in Saigon. March 29, 1971 -- Communists raided the town of Duc Duc in Quang Nam pro- vince to punish refugees who had resettled there. They killed 109 civilians as well as 23 of the militiamen who ? epulsed the attack. A�ril 2, 1971 -- South Viet-Nam protested to the International Control Commission the March mining of a bus in Long Khanh province where 78 civil- ian workers were killed or wounded in the explosion and subsequent massacre. P-470 April 21, 1971 PNJ o L OC� �4 I, ` � ��0��0� �d�'r I I ln�� '.1�I � :. �� BUR�,�,U of PUB�IC Q��,o,IR� CONSEQUENCES OF A PRECIPITATE UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM VIET-NAM There has been much honest and proper debate about the wisdam of the US commitment of troops to Viet-Nam as well as the past conduct of the war, but today the urgent question is not why we are in Viet-Nam, but how best to bring an end to the war and to achieve a just peace. President Nixon is second to none in his desire to end the fighting, and we are ready to take every reasonable step to do so, The United States and South Vietnamese Governments have publicly renounced the pur- suit of a purely military outcome of the war and have made numerous repeated overtures to induce the other side to nego- tiate a peaceful settlement of the issues at stake. So far the North Vie tnamese have not responded in a constructive way, Substantial Reduction of US Combat Troops Despite North Vietnamese intransigence in Paris, we are turn- ing over more and more of the fighting to the South Vietnamese forces, When he first outlined his program for the withdrawal of US troops in June 1969, the President set three criteria for these withdrawals : progress in the training and equipping of South Vietnamese forces, progress in the Paris peace talks and the level of enemy activity, Since tlnat time, the progress of the South Vietnamese armea forces has permitted us to withdraw over a quarter of a million of our troops and reduce American casualties substantiallyo By December 1971, we will have re- duced the troop ceiling to 184 000 men -- about one-third of the authorized 1eve1 of 549,50� at the beginning of 19690 The reductions are being made in a way that will not endanger other American troops or those of our allies in Viet-Nam, Fixed Date for US Withdrawal Would Help Enemv Some Americans suggest that we campletely withdraw our forces fram Viet-Nam by a specified dateo Others go so far as to demand, without regard to the consequences, an immediate and total US withdrawal, While President Nixon has stated that our goal is total withdrawal and has called for negotiation of a timetable for withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Viet-Nam, he has refused to fix a date for the unilateral with- drawal of our forceso As the President explained to the nation P - 486 Continued May 5, 1971 - 4 - � . international commitment, As a result, the risk of armed conflict in other areas of the world where peace has been maintained in part by a US commitment -- the Middle East, Europe including Berlin, Latin America -- would be increasedo The 20-year effort in Asia for collective security against communist expansion would be dangerously weakened, with serious implications for the non-communist countries in the areao All of our allies -- Asian and Western -- would feel compelled to reexamine the utility of their defense treaties with uso US Cannot Avoid Responsibilities as Free Wor1d Leader Some who oppose the war point to those countries that have with- drawn from their overseas engagements as thus having gained in prestige and world respectm The proponents of this argument seem to forget that those countries could act as they did with relative impunity because they could withdraw, so to speak, be- hind the shield held by the United Stateso We have no such handy shield. Abroad some people around the free world deplore our stand in Viet-Nam. They do not seem to realize that their own freedom is also ultimately at stake in the distant but very real battleground of Viet-Nam, Whether we like it or not, the United States is a world power. The Nixon Doctrine, proclaimed by the President at Guam in 1969, redefines the strong role the United States has assumed as leader of the free worldo The Doctrine calls for a readjust- ment of the balance of obligations among our European allies to reflect more accurately the economic and political realities of European progress, and it ca11s for nations threatened with insurgency or conventional aggression .to bear the principal responsibility for their own defenseo Under the Nixon Doctrine, the United States will gradually reduce its military presence overseas, providing material assistance as its allies supply the manpower to defend themselves. This policy is very evident in Viet-Namo It does not mean that we can avoid our responsi- bilities in helping to maintain world peace and stability in a nuclear age. The securing of a just and durable peace in Viet-Nam is one of those responsibilitieso If we were to flinch from our role and withdraw from Viet-Nam without assuring South Viet-Nam's ability to defend itself, we would be causing great risks to world peaceo P - 486 May 5, 1971 � �� • ` -� ��0�� yr I ,"�_ �� . �[[�R� BUR��U of PUB�IC Q��IR� PROGRESS IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM DESPITE WARTIME DIFFICULTIES Some critics of our assistance to South Viet-Nam point to political problems in that country and claim that the Govern- ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam is unrepresentative, repres- sive and corrupto They argue that such a government invali- dates the US commitment to Viet-Nam and that we should either force political changes there or withdraw completely and im- mediatelya This view is far too negative and one-sidedo � It focuses on South Viet-Nam's acknowledged political difficulties and short- comings and overlooks the impressive progress the South Viet- namese have been making -- under extremely trying wartime con- ditions -- to develop viable political institutions of their own choice and responsive to their own needso Major Steps in Political Development In the last five years, South Viet-Nam has taken major steps to establish a more effective and responsive government, On September 11, 1966 a Constituent Assembly was elected to draft a new constitution, which was promulgated on April 1, 19670 National elections for President and Vice President and the Upper House of the National Assembly followed on September 3, 1967o These elections, in which some 408 million people, or 83 per cent of those registered, cast ballots, were freely observed by the large foreign press corps in South Viet-Nam and by numerous international observers, Nearly as many voters participated in the October 22 election of the Lower House of the National Assemblyo On October 31 President Thieu was in- augurated and the new government assumed its responsibilities under the constitutiono In a parallel development, elections for local officials have been taking place in South Viet-Nam since April 1967o Today approxi.mately 95 per cent of the ham- lets and villages in South Viet-Nam have elected officialso Firm Electoral Base of Government 1970 was a particularly busy election year, with most South Vietnamese citizens called upon to vote for local, provincial P - 4406 continued February 24, 1971 _ I / - _ __ - 4 - Thieu Endorses US Peace Proposals While restoring security and prosperity to a large part of the countryside, and organizing the South Vietnamese to under- take an increasing share of the fighting, the government has at the same time offered a forthcoming set of proposals as the basis for serious negotiation of a peaceful settlement with Hanoi and the Viet Congo On July 11, 1969, President Thieu offered to stake his government 's future on internation- ally-supervised elections in which the other side can openly participateo In addition, President Thieu firmly endorsed President Nixon's five-point peace praposal of October 7, 1970, which inc.luded a cease-fireo US Attitude We recognize that the government of South Viet-Nam, like any government, has imperfections and shortcomings, But we also recognize the considerable progress the South Vietnamese have already made and the additional efforts they are now under- taking despite enormous difficultieso On balance, the record of the constitutional government and institutions of South Viet-Nam has been an impressive and encouraging oneo The political problems the government still faces are of course internal ones for the South Vietnamese themselves to resolveo We cannot impose on them our own ideas of how their political system should be runo Indeed, this would run counter to our basic objective in Viet-Nam of helping assure that the � South Vietnamese people are able to determine their own politi- ca1 future free of outside interferenceo We do not necessarily agree with every action they take in this regard, but we will continue to provide support and assistance whenever we usefully can to help them overcome difficulties and remedy shortcomings which may existo P - 4406 February 24, 1971 \ PM�3��C� � , oar�or�w�u�a�a�w .� n�� y� �� BUR�QU of PUB�IC ��QIR� THE AMERICANS AND THE PEOPLE OF SO�UTH VIET-NAM - PART I* Today the people of South Viet-Nam are being given a choice between two opposing ways of life. The average Vietnamese may not be a skilled dialectician, but he has given ample evi- dence that he understands the true nature of cammunism. In 1954, after the Viet Minh victor� over the French, more tl:�an 800,000 Vietnamese in the North 'voted with their feet" �gai.nst cammunism and fled to the South. In South Viet-Nam, the flow of refugees has been one way -- from enemy areas to areas under Government control. The Viet Cong receive little spontaneous support from the people ; what cooperation they get is often extracted by force and terror. The Goverrnnent of Viet-Nam (GVN) does not yet have overwhelming popular support, but it is making significant progress, with US cooperation, in reach- ing the people and assisting them to achieve better living conditions in increasing security. The Negative View Dissenters to United States assistance to South Viet-Nam often charge that differences in American an�l Vietnamese cultures , traditions and ways of life prevent effective cooperation. They also charge that we are exhausting ourselves in a fruit- less endeavor for which we will never receive any gratitude. Critics of the -��r, citing isolated incidents and distorted re- ports, have gone so far as to suggest that Americans are hated by the majority of the South Vietnamese who want the US troops out of Viet-Nam immediately. Some have even expressed the demonstrably false view that the South Vietnamese, wanting peace at any price, are indifferent to the form of their government. These negative views do not stand up in light of American- Vietnamese progress in the mutual effort to build a viable demo- cratic society while defending it against communist aggression. The Positive View South Viet-Nam, torn by war for decades, obviously wants peace. The South Vietnamese, like any people with an old and proud culture and a national consciousness, are aware that while our forces shield them fram the enemy, their presence inhibits the p - 4441 * See P - 4442 in this May 6, 1971 Series for Par_t..ZZ. - 4 - creasing appreciably since the introduction in 1967 of "mir- . . acle'� rice, which is expected to return Viet-Nam to self- � sufficiency in this basic food in 1971. Meat production has also increased substantially, and AID has sustained this in- crease by providing the necessary additional livestock feed. Improved production_ and marketing techniques have stimulated vegetable and fruit production. AID has assisted the GVN in establishing the Agricultural Development Bank to enable fan�n- ers to buy modern farm equipment and materials and to obtain cred?t at reasonable rates of interest. Focus on the Villages Destruction caused by the war is to blame for same of the needs of the Vietnamese, but the American effort goes far beyond replacing damaged property and caring for the wounded. More serious than bomb damage is the destruction of whole hamlets and villages in the course of battle. After the communist Tet offensive in 1968, a US Army division near Tay Ninh helped build 1,800 homes in five months for persons made homeless in the at- tacks. AID built a 2,000-unit apartment development in Cholon for families who lost their hames during the offensive. Assist- ance to villages and hamlets by AID and US military personnel has raised the 1eve1 of health and welfare in Viet-Nam. Over 10 million Vietnamese have been given medical and dental care by US medical and dental personnel. American-constructed hospitals, orphanages, schools and temples have provided the . Vietnamese, often for the first time, with social benefits es- sential to a life with dignity. Minor projects include capping disease-infested wells, creating public reading rooms, renovating market places, and constructing dispensaries and playgrounds where none existed before. Civic pride at the village 1eve1 is increased by the GVN`s self-development program, which makes substantial funds (over $20 million in 1970) available for use by village goverrnnents to carry ou� projects inspired in part by American initiatives. Sound Basis for Further Growth A sound basis for the future has thus been laid. The American and Vietnamese armed forces have trained a core of workers skilled as carpenters, plumbers, electricians and mechanics. Over 25,000 village and hamlet officials have been trained in public administration, and 15,000 new �outh Vietnamese teachers have graduated since 1965. Today over 85 per cent of South Viet-Nam's children of elementary school age attend classes, compared to fe,aer than 10 per cent fifteen years ago. Secondary school enrollment has climbed from ��,000 students in 1955 to 623,000 in 1970, and university enrollment is up fram 2,900 to 40,000 students, with several new universities open. These are all assets to the nation-building force on which the future of South Viet-Nam depends. , The assistance and cooperation vf Americans have contributed dee�si�vely to that future. P - 4441 May 6, 1971 �� t;e ,.' 8�1��6��vI Q�0��1 - �[�I�O�� BUR�,�U of PUB�IC Q��,�,IR� THE AMERICANS AND THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM - PART II� The United States, in addition to helping the South Vietnamese defend themselves against communist aggression, is assisting them to achieve better living conditions , For example, the United States has contributed to the growth of the Vietnamese school and university system. Americans involved in this task realized that this system had to be based on the Vietnamese cul- tural heritage ; they did not attempt to import a foreign system. Many Americans in Viet-Nam -- military and civilian -- have par- ticipated in this work. American volunteer teachers have taught in Vietnamese schools and universities to help overcome the serious teacher shortage. The frequent voluntary participation of American military personnel in education and other civic action programs is not as well publicized as their actions on the battlefield. However, beneficial civic� action projects have enhanced the good relations between the Vietnamese people and the American soidiers and serve to mitigate the destructive ef- fects of the war. Vietnamese Accept Costs of Their Defense It is sometimes alleged that, in the US effort to help South Viet- Nam, heavy casualties are inflicted on innocent civilians, their land bombed beyond reclamation and their country's plant life damaged past recovery. This concern for South Viet-Nam is under- standable, but the Vietnamese people would not want it used as an argument for °bringing US forces h�cne i.mmediately .and before they are able to assume total responsibility for their own de- fense. The Vietnamese know the Americans are helping themo They understand and accept the costs of the defensive effort against the North Vietnameseo US Troops Take Risks to Avoid Harming Noncambatants The United States does not sanction intentional harming of non- combatants. Such actions violate the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims as we11 as the customary law of war. Often, contrary to sound military practice, the people of an area are notified in advance of US and South Vietnamese operations in order to prevent civilian ca.sualtieso American fighting men are instructed to avoid causing undue hardship among noncambatants. Allied operations are planned and carried out to minimize loss of P - 4442 * See P - 4441 in this May 6, 1971 Series for Part I - 4 - . : • . military targets, but the total area of two and one-half mil- lion holes 45 feet in diameter amounts to a miniscule .216 per cent -- slightly more than two-tenths of one per cent -- of the entire area of South Viet-Nam. Moreover, most bombing (like defoliation) was done in jungle and in other uncultivated or uninhabited areas . While the war has caused same damage to farm land, the damage is not of such proportions that the land can- not be put back into use. Indeed, this is being done as secu- xity i.�nproves and farmers return to fields they were forced tem- porarily to abandon. Many visitors to South Viet-Nam are surprised to find that the reputed "lunar landscape'� does not exist. One group of private Americans, after visiting Viet-Nam in 1969, reported, "We had expected to see a devastated country with ruined cities, de- spoiled forests and bamb craters dotting the land. After travel- ing fram east to west, north to south., and covering tens of thousands of square miles of territory, we found nothing of the kind. South Viet-Nam is today still a beautiful, lush country -- damaged but not devastated. " Tear Gas Saves Lives The use of riot-control agents in Viet-Nam has been scored by those who do not understand that their use is not only militar- ily advantageous but has saved the lives of many Vietnamese civilians and Allied troops. Tear gas is often used in Viet-Nam when caves and tunnels are suspected of harboring enemy troops and, perhaps, innocent civilian hostages. It has been used when enemy troops infiltrated population centersa The employment of tear gas is consistent with the US effort to use the most ef- fective tactics and weapons to hold casualties and property damage to an absolute minimum. Contrast Between US and Enemy Actions Conversely the enemy often attacks hainlets and villages defend- ed only by farmers who care for their crops by day and become militia at night. The enemy also sets booby traps which often claim civilians as victims. Throughout the war, the Viet Cong have assassinated village and hamlet officials, kidnapped persons of all ages and forced young men and even boys into their ranks, The care taken by US and South Vietnamese forces to save lives is noted by the people. Since 1965 over three million South Vietnamese have fled from enemy areas to Government areas. American and Sauth Vietnamese military operations have enabled almost two-thirds of them by now to return to their homes or to be resettled in new areas. It is evident that, despite all the vicissitudes of war, most Vietnamese place their hopes in their Government and are determined to defend their country, P - 4442 May 6, 1971 G��B� : � a��a�a�r� ��e�� BUR�,�,U of PUB�IC �,��,�,IRS "PEOPLE 'S PEACE TREATY" A number of college students and others have requested the views of the Department of State on a "Joint Treaty of Peace between the People of the United States and the People of South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam" which is currently being circulated by the National Student Association. Provisions of "Treaty" This document : -- demands "i.mmediate and total" withdrawal of United States forces from Viet-Nam, but sa,ys �othing about withdrawal of the North Viet- namese forces from South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. -- places the communist side under no obliga- tion to release the Americans they hold prisoner, and requires Hanoi only to "enter discussions" on the question. -- obligates the United States to remove the government of South Viet-Nam, a government which was constitutionally elected to office by the people of that country. -- contains no provision for ending the fight- ing in Laos or Cambodia, other than a re- iteration of intention to respect the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, which have been violated by North Viet-Nam ever since. -- contains no provision for international super- vision of the implementation of any of its terms. P - 44.�5 March 9, 1971 Continued . 7 M � � 2 - The provisions of this paper are in essence the same terms which have been put forward repeatedly over the past two years by the communist delegation in Paris. They have not proved acceptable to any political group in South Viet- Nam except the Viet Cong. What's Blocking Progress Toward Peace? The United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam have pro- posed a program for peace which includes an immediate cease- fire throughout Indochina under effective international supervision; withdrawal of outside forces ; a political settlement in South Viet-Nam which reflects the existing relationship of political forces ; an Indochina peace con- ference ; and immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides. Our two governments have stated that we are prepared to negotiate seriously on the basis of these proposals. At the same time, we are prepared to discuss the proposals of the communist side as well, without any preconditions. The communist response has been an adamant refusal to en- gage in discussions on a peace settlement unless their de- mands are accepted in advance. It is this position which has blocked any progress toward peace. It is this position which those who want peace should try to change. P - 4455 March 9, 1971 • �� ,. :: .,.a'' ��0� _, ,r �� Ra�� BUR�,o,U of PUB�IC ,o,��/�IR� UNITED STATES EFFORTS TOWARD ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT A fundamental objective of United States foreign policy is a world of enduring peace and justice, in which differences be- tween nations can be resolved without resort to war. Our im- mediate objective is to leave behind an era of confrontation and to enter an era of negotiation. Proposals for General and Complete Disarmament In 1962 we presented to the disarmament conference in Geneva our "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" which calls for re- duction of weapons by stages and the verification of compliance in each of the three reduction stages. The Soviet Union also proposed a general and complete disarma- ment plan in 1962, but its plan did not permit inspection dur- ing the disarnnament process. Deliberations in Geneva made it clear that formidable difficulties stand in the way of agree- ment on a program for general and complete disarmament. The conference turned its attention to other arms control measures upon which agreement might be achieved. Progress on Other Measures of Arms Control Agreements have been reached with respect to nuclear weapons tests, a "hot line" communications link and a non-proliferation treaty. Recent Geneva negotiations resulted in the drafting of a treaty to prevent emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on ocean floors. This treaty was approved by a UN General Assembly resolution on December 7, 1970, and was opened for signature in Washington, London and Moscow on February 11. Other treaties have been promulgated to prevent the orbiting of mass destruction weapons in outer space and the deployment of weapons in Antarctica. Bilateral US-Soviet talks now in progress are taking up the problem of limiting strategic weapons. Limited Test Ban Treaty In 19b3 fhe United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet L�nion drew up the Limited Test Ban Treaty which prohibits P - 702 Continued March 19, 1971 ,y � HERMAN E.TALMADCiE.GA.�CFiA1RMAN � � �� ALLEN J.ELLENDER,LA. JACK MILLER,IOWA � /` � �' � JAMES O.EASTLAND�MISS. GEOROE D.AIKEN�VT. �� B.EVERETP JORDAN�N.G. MILTON R.YOUNG,N.DAK. GEORpE MCGOVERN�5.DAK. CARL T.CURTIS,NEBR. JAMES B.ALLEN,ALA. ROBERT DOLE,1(ANS. HUBERT H.HUMPHREY.MINN. HENRY BELLMON�OKLA. '�1 Crrrf eb .�f af¢� .�iertiaf e LAWTON CHILE3,Fu. COTYS M.MOUSER�CHIEF CLERK COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 July 9, 1971 Mr. Harry E. Marshall C ity C le rk 386 City Hall St. Paul, Minnesota 55102 Dear Mr. Marshall: Thank you for the copy of the City Council's Resolution of June 1, 1971 stating their opposition to continued involvement of U. S. military forces in Southeast Asia. I assure you that I will do a11 that I can to see that our disengagement from this tragic and costly war is terminated as soon as possible. I supported the Hatfield-McGovern Amendment and will continue to encourage this kind of action by the Senate. Best wishes. Sincerely, Hube rt H, Humphr y ��fiil . �. �� .� � FINRRIk/N A.WILLIAMS.JR..NJ.�(,7fA1RMAN /) 1 ��yyy JE�VNINfl6 RANDOLPN.W.VA. JACOB K.JAVITS,N,Y. i� - . ' ^ � �. /� CLAIBORN6 PELL.R.I. WINSTON L.PROUTY.VT. C� � � � EDWARD M.KENNEDY.MA83. PETER N.DOMINICK.COLO, 6AYLORD NELSON.WIS. RICHARD 8.SCHWEIKER.PA. WALTER F.MONDALE.MINN. ROBERT W,PACICWppD,ORE6. �C�rf eb .$�f a�e� ,�¢r�af e TNOMA8 P.EA6LETON.MO. ROBERT TAlT,JR.,OHIO ALI�N CRANSTON.CALIP. J.6LENN BPALL.JR..MD. HAROLD E.MU6NE8.IOWA ADLJ11 E.STEVENSON 111,ILL. COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE STEWART E MCCLURE,STAPF DIR6CTOR ROBERT E NMiLE.GENERAL COUN36L WASHINGTON,D.C. ZOS�O June 30, 1971 Harry E . Ma,rshall, City Clerl� 386 City xall St . Pau l, Minnesota 55102 Dear Harry: Thank you very much for sEnding me a copy of the resolution by the St . Paul City Council expressing opposition to the continued involvement of United States military forces in South- east Asia. I am most grateful to have this expression for I share your outlool� in fullest measure . Our country, in my estimation, is being seriously hurt by our continued involvement in this mindless and seemingly endless war . As you probably are aware, I have endeavored by every means opento me as a Sena�or to promote the strongest possible influence on the Administration to bring about an immediate end to our military involvement in that tragic war . On June 16th, I voted most enthusiastically f or the McGovern-Hatfield amendment to terminate funds for U. S. forces in Indochina on December 31, 1�71. Although the amendment was defeated �+2-55, it won the strongest support yet in the U. S. Senate for our military disengage ment from that unhap�y land . On June 22nd, I voted in favor of the Mansfield resolution calling for withdrawal of our military forces from Indochina not later than nine months from enactment of the new Selective Service Act . This resolution, which is co ntingent upon Nort h Vietnamese release of American prisoners of war, was passed by a vote of 57-42 . Concurrence of the House in this measure, un- f ortunately, is highly problematical. No one can ignore the fateful impact of the war in Southeast Asia . The Vietnamese people have undergone untold suffering ; their country has been indescribably ravaged . More than �0,000 American ssrvicemen have been Killed, and several hundred thousand wounded . Our own society has experienced severe divisions and disruptions because of this conflict . . �. � • Mr . Harry E. Marshall Page 2 June 30, 1971 The Atdministration obviously needs still more persuasion on this most critical issue . I thinK the action of the Council in expressing itself on this matter constitutes the highest possible service to our nation in this hour of agony. I suggest that a simil�a r resolution directed toward the President himself would be a very constructive step . Please express my great admiration and respect to each and every member of the Council for this most edifying action . I am proud to be one of your fellow Minnesotans . Sincerel � �� Wa 1 e �Y 25, 1971 ts. Dan�.el .k�... Klaa t�ca:r�r�r�.�ir�rz Caunsel �3ui3.d�.n� Ue�.r ;>�..rs �'}�e C�unc31 req�leats that you pre�a.re a resolution concurrin�, a.�a the su{;��tic�n �f Comptroller Mci�enna as set out in hig attachecl lettea^� au�;�estian bein� that the Caunci7. go on record favorin� �.n end te� th�: w�° now. Very truZ�r yours' City Clerk AO�ng June l, 197I The President aP the United 8te��a� The Wh�.te Hat�e Waethil�gtoa�� D. C. near sir; Eaclo�ed tor your in�'trrmation is a copy of a reaalution oP the 3t. Paul City Council�, exprea�s�ng t�ppoeit3or� to the cvntinued involv�mer�►t of United Statee milltaary forees in Sautheaat Asia. Very trua,y' yaurs, City Clerk ��6 Also sent �o: Senator Walter F. Nl�ndale � " Hubert H. Humphrey Representatives Robert Ber�land Ancher Nelsen John Blatnik John Zwaeh .Donald �aser Albert Qu3e William Frenzel Joseph E. Karth