98-683\
/
Presented By
Refened To
��������
RESOLUTION
CITY OF SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA
L[I;
C e �. -
RESOLVED, that upon the request of Jeffrey Jacobsson, pursuant to Minn. Stat. §
465.76, for reunbursement of attorney's fees incuned by him in the defense of a criminal charges
against him, which charges the Council finds azose out of the reasonable and lawful performance
of duties for the City of Saint Paul, and after consultation with the office of the city attorney, the
Council hereby directs that the appropriate city officials pay the amount of $16,000 by draft
payable jointly to the said Jeffrey Jacobsson and Earl P. Gray, attorney for Jacobsson, in fu11 and
complete reimbursement for said fees.
Requested by Department of:
By:
Adopted by Councii: Date ���
Adoption Certified by Council S etary
By: � -�
Approve + �ayo . Date
By:
�I
Form Ap roved by City Attorney
B � � l� �u 7- 2 -9�
Approved by Mayor for Submission to Counci]
By:
Council File # "\ 6� G d 3
Green Sheet # � ��_�
t•�`�I
Council
OATEINITNTm
7/29/98 GREEN SHEET
n,o 62171
GOUIICli YTeS. JSOStTOm Ybb-25bbU Uo[rutr�rtueBCrat L�rnYCwMCI—
JSTBEONCOUNGLAGENDABY(Q4T�
AUG. 5, 1998 �"
MUYBERiOR tliYAiiORIEY CRYGiNIt
ROViING
� ❑ RIRIICULfERVICFiON. HIYYLLfErtV/11CCf6
❑ wroRlortbmxAMt) ❑
TOTAL # OF SIGNATURE PAGES (CLJP ALL LOCATIONS FOR SIGNATURE)
Reimburing attorney fees to Saint Paul Police Officer for his defense of criminal charges
in the amount of $16,000.00
PLANNING COMMISSION
CIB COMMITTEE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Has fhis persoNfirm everworked under a wrRract for thic departmeM?
YES NO
Has ihia DereoNfirtn a:er been a city empbyee9
YES NO
Does this persoNfirm possess a sldll not nwmallypossessetl by any curteM ciry empbyee?
YES NO
is Mis pereonRirtn a targeted venda?
YES NO
R�S'���Ch £.'•sn+��
APPROVED
r.r.�i_�m.:ar��.�
OF TRANSACTION S
SOURCE
COSTIREVQIUE BUD6ETED (CIRCIE ON�
ACTIVITY NUMBER
YES NO
(EJ�IAIN)
\
�
q�-c.8�
FAC'T SHEET
Jacobsson Reimbursement
Officer was on dury, in uniform. October 18, 1994.
He struck handcuffed suspect (on video tape) at Dayton's.
Deroartmental discipline
Officer was disciplined, and received a 7-day suspension for this and one other incident.
Criminal chazees
OfFcer was chazged with 2 counts of 5`" degree assault.
Judge Poritsky acquitted on both counts after trial, finding that the force used by the officer was
not unzeasonable. 3- -95
Earl Crray's bill to the officer was $18,125.00. Part of that was a retainer of $2500, which has
been paid, but I am not sure whether the Federation or the officer paid it. Earl would take
$16,000 total in "settlemenY' to avoid fiirther delays.
Civil liabilitv
Suit by suspect was settled for $8,000; $6,000 by City, $2,000 by Dayton's.
Suspecdvictim
The suspect was convicted of felony theft, got 13 months and fine, 5 yeazs probation. 1-3-95.
/.
qS-GP3
Interdepartmental Memorandum
CITY OF SAINT PAUL
DATE: July 2, 1998
TO: Council President Dan Bostrom ��������
FROM:
Phil Byrne�
� ��
J U L 2_ 1998
�" �� ��
._
RE: Officer Jacobsson request for reimbursement
Background and Facts
Offlcer Jef&ey Jacobsson of the Saint Paul Police Department has requested, through his attorney,
Eazl P. Cnay, that he be reimbursed for attorney's fees that he l�as incurred in the defense of crimnial
charges against him.
The bill for attorney's fees presented to the officer was $18,125.00, of which the attorney has
received a$2,500.00 retainer. A copy of that bill is attached. In my opinion Mr. Gray's bill and his
hourly rate is reasonable given (1) his experience, skill and reputation as a criminal defense lawyer
in the community, and (2) the fact that the matter went to trial, and required full triai preparation and
trial tune. While the bill should not necessarily reflect the outcome, attorneys who prepaze fully and
in detail will more often than not obtain a better result, and in this case the judge rendered a verdict
of not guilty. In this case, I have spoken with Mr. Gray, and he is willing to accept less than the total
amount, i.e., $16,000, if he can save the time and preparation of an appearance before the Council
on the matter. The resolution I have prepazed reflects that willingness.
The incident, occurring October 18, 1994, involved a person in custody on charges of shoplifting,
whom the officer was charged with assauiting while the person was handcuffed. The officer was
acquitted of the assault charges after a trial to the court. A copy of the judge's memarandum decision
is attached. It should be noted that the judge deternvned that the degree of force that the officer used
was not shown to be unreasonable under all the facts. The particular judge is respected and has an
excellent reputation in the judicial and legal community.
The person who was in custody ultimately was convicted of felony theft on January 3, 1995, and
received a felony-level sentence.
� q� -Gt3
The officer was disciplined by the police department, and received a 7-day suspension for this and
another incident.
A civil suit brought by the arrested person against the City and the department store was settled
favorably, with the City paying $6,000 and the deparnnent store $2,000.
LeFal Analysis
Minn. Stat. § 465.76, a copy of which is attached, allows but does not require a ciry (after
consultation with its own legal counsel) to reimburse an employee for legal fees arising out of the
defense against criminal charges when those chazges arose out of the reasonable and lawful
performance of duties for the city.
The city has in the past considered such requests, and each appears to have been handled on the
particulaz facts and merits of each such request.
The officer in this case was on duty, in uniform and responding to a call for police services. It
appeazs that the Council could reasonably determine, in view of the finding of the trial court that the
degree of force used was reasonabie, that this incident "azose out of the reasonable and lawful
performance of duties for the city ... ." The Council could reasonably deternvne that as a policy
matter the judgment of a police officer made during an incident involving potenrial crime should be
second-guessed only with care, particulazly when supported by a later judicial fmding. It could
determine as well that the disciplinary sanction was punishxnent enough, and that the additional
burden of legal defense fees is too much.
On the other hand, the statute is discretionary, and does not mandate reimbursement. The Council
could reasonably decide that it would never pay for criminal defense fees when the matter involves
an alleged assault on a handcuffed person in custody. The Council could also determine not to pay
legai defense fees in cases where the City is required to pay money in settlement of a civil suit.
Recommendation
For whatever it is worth, my recommendation is that the officer be reimbursed as indicated in the
resolution.
However, I would also recommend that you give some consideration to the passage of an ordinance
that would establish a procedure for considering reimbursement claims of this kind, as well as the
development of standards or criteria by which you wouid evaluate future claims. The types of
standards or factars might include whether the employee was acquitted of the charges, and the basis
for the acquittal; the nature of the alleged offense, and its degree of severity; collateral matters such
as civii suits and internal disciplinary actions and what those outcomes were; whether the employee
was acting at the direction of a supervisor or superior; degree of good faith involved in the action;
whether the morale of other employees would be adversely affected if the fees were paid or not paid;
and whether employees and officers would be less likely to cany out job responsibilities in the
vigorous manner that would be consistent with the public interest if such fees were not paid. The
� �[y- �P3
�
statute is silent on many of these factors. I believe that our office has made this suggestion in the
past, and we wouid be happy to assist in the drafting and prepazation of such an ordinance.
Please feel free to shaze this memo with council members and their aides, or other members of the
administration, as you may see fit.
cc: Tom Fabel
Deputy Mayor
Peg Birk
City Attarney
�
9!-GPs
:���r����;��`
;JLI
(�i�R �9 1995
March 28, 1995
Fred R. Owusu
St. Paul City Clerk
Room 170 City Hall
St. Paul, MN 55102
Gentlemen:
Timothy
St. Paul
St. Paul
St. Paul
Enclosed is a bill for legal services and exper.ses from my
�egal cc�: r:sel, �arl Gray. Z raa pay:ner.t cf this b' 1 i
- � 3 n th�
amount of $18,372.00 pursuant to' Minn. Stat. 465.76, and this
city's past practice of reimbursement of police officer's for legal
Eees in criminal cases arising out of the reasonable and lawful
performance of their duties.
In State v. Jacobsson, I
assault in the fifth degree.
Poritsky after a three day trial.
let me know when I will receive a
�
; r f-
was charged
I was found
Enclosed is
check so I m
GIT� �E�C►KC�FY
ttorn•ay
all
5102
with two counts of
not guilty by Judge
his verdict. Please
ay advise my counsel.
Very truly yours, .
��� �
Officer Jeffrey Jacobsson
I- . F ?
E. Marx
City A
City H
, MN 5
I .
/
qr-�r�
G� M�I�eko
LAW OFr�CES
' Eari P. Gray
Richard J. Malacko
•Afso admitred ro plac:ice in wscor:sn
Jeffrey Jacobsson
19193 Euclid Path
Farmington, NIN 55024
386 North Wabasha SVeet
654 Capi;a( CenVe
54 Paul, Minnesota 55102
(612) 223•5175
r'zx (612) 223-5179
Re: State ci *ii.^.nesota v. �eirrey 3accbsscn
----------------------------------------------
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED:
12/1/94 meeting with client
12/7/94 arraignment and meet with prosecutor re: tape
12/8/94 review file and preparation for trial
12/15J94 Motion To Suppress and letter
1/10/95 interview witnessess and review case
1/24/95 preparation for defense and review tape •
2/6/95 conference with client, research use of
force, review tape
2/15/95 preparation £or pzetrial, review case
and tape
2/16/95 pretrial .
2/27/95 telephone con£erence with prosecutor
preparation for trial
3/9/95 expert test research
3/11/95 preparation £or trial
3/13/95 interview witnesses, telephone conference
with prosacutor, praparaticn for trial,
serve subpoena, telephor.e conference
with clerk
3/14/95 telephone conference probation o£fice
re: subpoena, legal research
3/16/95 meet with witness, study videotape,
trial preparation
3/20/95 trial preparation
3/21/95 trial preparation and trial
3/22/95 trial preparation and trial
3/23/95 trial preparation and trial
72 1/2 hours @$250 per hr.
Less retainer
Office Manag
Carol A. Rumi
ot Counset
Mark D. Nyvc
Michael A. Fe
Hours
2
3
5
1
2 1/2
3
2
2
2 1/2
2
2
3
5
2 1/2
3
2
10
10
10
$18,125.00
-2.500.00
$15,625.00
i y �
i / =,
C'i {; i . i 1
\
j • MRF-2J-1995 10 � 40 '"=,"�1TRA� TEFM OFF [ CE Ei2 292 ,',6'0 F. 01 � p, `��
' /' 1
`j� ���-��- Sc�I�1�i 7�e �z� � A �- -c- S
VERDICT - v � �� UO / �,��� �
STATE v. J..FFR�Y .IACOBSON L,nc;�'-e°K,�Xi7
In thzs cas_ the defendan� faces two charges of Assault
in the FiPth Degrse. Both were alleged to have occurred ay a
resulC of the same iacident on October 18, 1994_ In the £irst
charge, de£endant was alleged to have committed an act upon Wfllie
Howard with intent to cause fear in Willie Howard of immediate
hodily harm or death. In the aecond eharge, it is alleged that
tise de£endant intenta.onally iaflicted or attempted eo infiict
bodily harm upon Willie Howard. The state clearly t�as proven
beyond a reasoztable doubt all the elements of both chazges.
Specifically, with reapect to tite first, I find that defendant
did commit an act - in fact, two acts - with 3ntent to nause fear
in Willie Howard of immediate bodi].y harm. With respec� to the
second charge, I find that defendant inflicted bodily harm upon
Willie Howa'rd and did so intentionally. Of cautse, a21 the acCs
occurxed withzn Ramsey County.
The defensa to these charges is that defendant acted
lawfully and used reasonable force in so acting. Spacifica2ly,
defendant made a pzima facie showing thaC he used reasonable force
,
ia exeeaCing � duty imposed upon him, specifically, the recovery
ot atolen property which would be used as evidence and/or returned
to the lawful owner, pursuant to 689.Ob(S); and also that defendant
aeted pursuant to 509,06(4) 3.n asaisting the lawful owner o£ the
property, Dayton's, and the other retaflers in the same area,
with resisting Wi11ie Howard's further interference with their
�roperty. Defendant having made e pr£ma facie showing that he
—�_
/ I •
hIA�'c-2d 10�41 �v?AL TcA`I GFrI�e 612 292 36'70 P.Q2
� `i� -6�3
actad lawfully, the burden of the peravas3on then ehifted to the
prosecution to disprove the defenae that the de£endant acted wiLh
ressonable force. It 3s my find3ng that the prosecution failed
to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant
is, therefoxe, £ound not guilty on both charg,es,
T'd Iike to make these co�ents for the record. It
is true that aC the Cime the defendant pushed and siapped Willie
Howard, Howard was handcvffed. Moreover, it is clear that ha
was no threat to defendant or any other officer. Howaver, the
officera were under an obligation to take the clotlies from Fioward. �
They were under ehia obligation for two reaaons. First, it appeared
that Howatd had done a conaiderable amount o£ shipliEting, and
the o£ficers were undez an obligaCion to determina wheCher any
of ths itams in HowaYd's poasesaion were stolen and, if ao, from
whom. This would be necessary to determine whethez or not a crime
had been aommiCeed and to gathcr evidence 3n order to prone the
crime later. Second, at some point the officere would have Co
xemave Xoward from Dayton's and take him to the Public Safety
Building. Zt �could be inappropriaCe for them to take Howard to
t'he po7.i,ce station wearing clothea that everyone knew were in •
£aat stolen. Therefore, they were under aa obligation to remove
the stolen property from him, within a reasonable time, before
they le£t the Pub7.ia Safety $uilding,
According tio the teatimvny of Mr. Howard himself, he
had been maintaining that ali the clothes were his and that only
the CD player was sto7.en. This waa true as late as 6:04, when
Howard was talking to Dayton's employee Richard Hasty, Shortly
-2-
I
h7F�i-24-1995 10�4: '��qL TEfaM OFrICE
612 292 36'70 P, a3
q�.68�
thereafter. de£endant came into the room and, as is clear, pushed
How&t'd with considerable force and slagped him on the right side
of Haward's face. Howard thereafter bacame cooperative and agreed
to turn over hfs clothes to Che officers. Up to that time, it
is my finding that Fiowaxd had insisted thaC onlq the CD pLayer
was stalen, and that all Che clothes - even thoae obviously stolen
- were legitimateZy his.
On the ciraumstances, I do not £ind that the state has
proven the officeY's use of force was unreasonable. Both the
parties have spoken of the contiuum of force, and EveretC Doolittle
[phonetia� Ceatified concerning it. One of Che criticai elements
o� evidence in thia case is the faat �hat, even at the lawer levels
of the use of xorce, specifically the eogC, �mpty hand, 1t is
gppropziate for a police officar to inflict minor, temporary,
noninjurious pain upon a sub3acC in oYder to gec that person's
compliance. In my view, that ia exaccly what the defendant did
in this case, There is, it 3.s true, something degrading about
a handcuffed indivi.dual being slapped in the face. Howevex, in
tarms of overall compliance, it seems to be less painful than
continuous pressure ori a pressure point, or continuous joint manipu-
lation, in order to achieve campJ.iance. Any greater force, as
defendant testified when asked about a closed fist, would have
exceeded the bounds of reasonableneas, and an offense would have
been committed.
As to other aiternatives, I concLude that further wait-
ing would have been fruitless, as Howard consistently had main-
tained, even as late as 6:04, that ail the clothes were his. As
-3-
i�YaFt-24-1995 10 � 42 �7� 7EFM � I� 612 292 367g P. 84
- . . �� � i p/! .. •--�
IA .•
to the opCion of again asking Howard to remova hia clothea, I
£ind that that opCioa had been attempted to a reasonable degree
and FToward did noC camply. Fiaally, aa to the option of having
enoagh of£icers force the suspeCt to remove his clothes without
striking hi.m, it is clear thaC this could hava reaulted in injury
to Howard or to the officers. � �
-4-
y»
RIGtIIS, POWERS A.�ID Df,77FS; MUNI(;[PALTITFS 465.77
heating system. The authority may, in conjuncdon with a district heaung system, acquire,��
own, construct, and operate anciilary services related to an energy management and control
system including, but not limited to, sensing and monitorin� services for supervision of fue
and life safety systems and building security systems within the city.
This section shall be effective for a port authority only after adoption of an ordinance or
resolution by the board of the port authority and by the governing body of the city stating
their intention to exercise the authority ailawed by this section.
A port authority may, with approval of the city, lease part or all of the dis�ict heating
system or contract with respect to part or ail of the dish heating system, with any person,
corpora[ion, association, or public utility company for the purpose of construcring, unprov-
ina, operating, or maintaining the district heating system.
Subd. 8. Management of a district heating system by a port authority. A statutory or
home rule charter city within which a port authority has been created may delegate to the port
authority some or ail powen and responsibilities for the management and operation of a dis-
trict heating system.
Subd. 9. Operation by a county. A statutory or home rule charter city may contract
with a county to operate a district heatino system for the provision of district heating services
within some or all of the city. �
History: 1981 c 334 s 6; 1981 c 3.i6 s 248; 1982 c 561 s 12; 1984 c 449 s 1-4;
1987 c 291 s 224, c 312 art 1 s 10 subd 1; 1993 c 327 s 19-21
465.75 REGULATION OF VEHICLE TOWERS LIhIITED.
Subdivision 1. Definitions. For the purposes of this section, the following terms have
the meanings given them:
(a) "Uehicle tower" means a person enga�ed in the business of towing or recovering
vehicles by means of a crane, hoist, tow bar, tow line, or dolly for the purpose of moving or
transporting wrecked, daznaged, disabled, replacement, or abandoned vehicles; and
@) "Municipality" means a statutory or home rule charter city or a town.
Subd. 2. Request by owner. I3o municipality may prohibit the operation within its
boundaries of a vehicle tower who is not licensed by that municipaliry and who is responding
to a service request from a person who is the owner or operator or the agent of the owner or
operator of the motor vehicle for which vetricle towin= service is requested.
Subd. 3. Private property. No vehicle tower may remove a motor vehicle by towing,
carrying, haulin� or pushin� from private property except at the request of a person who is the
owner or operator or the agent of the owner or operator of the vehicle, or the owner or agent of
the owner of the private property.
History: 1983 c 115 s 1
465.76 LEGAL COUNSEL; REII�IBURSEb1ENT.
If reimbursement is requested by the o�cer or employee, the goveming body of a home
rule charter or statutory city or county may, after consultation with its legal counsel, reim-
burse a city or counry officer or employee for any costs and reasonable attorney's fees in-
curred by the person to defend chazges of a criminal nature brouoht against the person that
arose out of the reasonable and lawful performance of duties for the city or county, provided
if less than a quorum of the goveming body is disinterested, that such reimbursement shall be
approved by a judge of the district court.
History: 1984 c 650 s 1
465•77 REGULATION OF DRILLING TO PROTECT NIINED UNDERGROUND
SPACE DEVELOPMENT.
A home rule charter city or statutory city may regulate driiling for the purposes and in
�e manner provided in section 469.141.
History: 1985 c 194 s 25: 1987 c 291 s 225
\
/
Presented By
Refened To
��������
RESOLUTION
CITY OF SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA
L[I;
C e �. -
RESOLVED, that upon the request of Jeffrey Jacobsson, pursuant to Minn. Stat. §
465.76, for reunbursement of attorney's fees incuned by him in the defense of a criminal charges
against him, which charges the Council finds azose out of the reasonable and lawful performance
of duties for the City of Saint Paul, and after consultation with the office of the city attorney, the
Council hereby directs that the appropriate city officials pay the amount of $16,000 by draft
payable jointly to the said Jeffrey Jacobsson and Earl P. Gray, attorney for Jacobsson, in fu11 and
complete reimbursement for said fees.
Requested by Department of:
By:
Adopted by Councii: Date ���
Adoption Certified by Council S etary
By: � -�
Approve + �ayo . Date
By:
�I
Form Ap roved by City Attorney
B � � l� �u 7- 2 -9�
Approved by Mayor for Submission to Counci]
By:
Council File # "\ 6� G d 3
Green Sheet # � ��_�
t•�`�I
Council
OATEINITNTm
7/29/98 GREEN SHEET
n,o 62171
GOUIICli YTeS. JSOStTOm Ybb-25bbU Uo[rutr�rtueBCrat L�rnYCwMCI—
JSTBEONCOUNGLAGENDABY(Q4T�
AUG. 5, 1998 �"
MUYBERiOR tliYAiiORIEY CRYGiNIt
ROViING
� ❑ RIRIICULfERVICFiON. HIYYLLfErtV/11CCf6
❑ wroRlortbmxAMt) ❑
TOTAL # OF SIGNATURE PAGES (CLJP ALL LOCATIONS FOR SIGNATURE)
Reimburing attorney fees to Saint Paul Police Officer for his defense of criminal charges
in the amount of $16,000.00
PLANNING COMMISSION
CIB COMMITTEE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Has fhis persoNfirm everworked under a wrRract for thic departmeM?
YES NO
Has ihia DereoNfirtn a:er been a city empbyee9
YES NO
Does this persoNfirm possess a sldll not nwmallypossessetl by any curteM ciry empbyee?
YES NO
is Mis pereonRirtn a targeted venda?
YES NO
R�S'���Ch £.'•sn+��
APPROVED
r.r.�i_�m.:ar��.�
OF TRANSACTION S
SOURCE
COSTIREVQIUE BUD6ETED (CIRCIE ON�
ACTIVITY NUMBER
YES NO
(EJ�IAIN)
\
�
q�-c.8�
FAC'T SHEET
Jacobsson Reimbursement
Officer was on dury, in uniform. October 18, 1994.
He struck handcuffed suspect (on video tape) at Dayton's.
Deroartmental discipline
Officer was disciplined, and received a 7-day suspension for this and one other incident.
Criminal chazees
OfFcer was chazged with 2 counts of 5`" degree assault.
Judge Poritsky acquitted on both counts after trial, finding that the force used by the officer was
not unzeasonable. 3- -95
Earl Crray's bill to the officer was $18,125.00. Part of that was a retainer of $2500, which has
been paid, but I am not sure whether the Federation or the officer paid it. Earl would take
$16,000 total in "settlemenY' to avoid fiirther delays.
Civil liabilitv
Suit by suspect was settled for $8,000; $6,000 by City, $2,000 by Dayton's.
Suspecdvictim
The suspect was convicted of felony theft, got 13 months and fine, 5 yeazs probation. 1-3-95.
/.
qS-GP3
Interdepartmental Memorandum
CITY OF SAINT PAUL
DATE: July 2, 1998
TO: Council President Dan Bostrom ��������
FROM:
Phil Byrne�
� ��
J U L 2_ 1998
�" �� ��
._
RE: Officer Jacobsson request for reimbursement
Background and Facts
Offlcer Jef&ey Jacobsson of the Saint Paul Police Department has requested, through his attorney,
Eazl P. Cnay, that he be reimbursed for attorney's fees that he l�as incurred in the defense of crimnial
charges against him.
The bill for attorney's fees presented to the officer was $18,125.00, of which the attorney has
received a$2,500.00 retainer. A copy of that bill is attached. In my opinion Mr. Gray's bill and his
hourly rate is reasonable given (1) his experience, skill and reputation as a criminal defense lawyer
in the community, and (2) the fact that the matter went to trial, and required full triai preparation and
trial tune. While the bill should not necessarily reflect the outcome, attorneys who prepaze fully and
in detail will more often than not obtain a better result, and in this case the judge rendered a verdict
of not guilty. In this case, I have spoken with Mr. Gray, and he is willing to accept less than the total
amount, i.e., $16,000, if he can save the time and preparation of an appearance before the Council
on the matter. The resolution I have prepazed reflects that willingness.
The incident, occurring October 18, 1994, involved a person in custody on charges of shoplifting,
whom the officer was charged with assauiting while the person was handcuffed. The officer was
acquitted of the assault charges after a trial to the court. A copy of the judge's memarandum decision
is attached. It should be noted that the judge deternvned that the degree of force that the officer used
was not shown to be unreasonable under all the facts. The particular judge is respected and has an
excellent reputation in the judicial and legal community.
The person who was in custody ultimately was convicted of felony theft on January 3, 1995, and
received a felony-level sentence.
� q� -Gt3
The officer was disciplined by the police department, and received a 7-day suspension for this and
another incident.
A civil suit brought by the arrested person against the City and the department store was settled
favorably, with the City paying $6,000 and the deparnnent store $2,000.
LeFal Analysis
Minn. Stat. § 465.76, a copy of which is attached, allows but does not require a ciry (after
consultation with its own legal counsel) to reimburse an employee for legal fees arising out of the
defense against criminal charges when those chazges arose out of the reasonable and lawful
performance of duties for the city.
The city has in the past considered such requests, and each appears to have been handled on the
particulaz facts and merits of each such request.
The officer in this case was on duty, in uniform and responding to a call for police services. It
appeazs that the Council could reasonably determine, in view of the finding of the trial court that the
degree of force used was reasonabie, that this incident "azose out of the reasonable and lawful
performance of duties for the city ... ." The Council could reasonably deternvne that as a policy
matter the judgment of a police officer made during an incident involving potenrial crime should be
second-guessed only with care, particulazly when supported by a later judicial fmding. It could
determine as well that the disciplinary sanction was punishxnent enough, and that the additional
burden of legal defense fees is too much.
On the other hand, the statute is discretionary, and does not mandate reimbursement. The Council
could reasonably decide that it would never pay for criminal defense fees when the matter involves
an alleged assault on a handcuffed person in custody. The Council could also determine not to pay
legai defense fees in cases where the City is required to pay money in settlement of a civil suit.
Recommendation
For whatever it is worth, my recommendation is that the officer be reimbursed as indicated in the
resolution.
However, I would also recommend that you give some consideration to the passage of an ordinance
that would establish a procedure for considering reimbursement claims of this kind, as well as the
development of standards or criteria by which you wouid evaluate future claims. The types of
standards or factars might include whether the employee was acquitted of the charges, and the basis
for the acquittal; the nature of the alleged offense, and its degree of severity; collateral matters such
as civii suits and internal disciplinary actions and what those outcomes were; whether the employee
was acting at the direction of a supervisor or superior; degree of good faith involved in the action;
whether the morale of other employees would be adversely affected if the fees were paid or not paid;
and whether employees and officers would be less likely to cany out job responsibilities in the
vigorous manner that would be consistent with the public interest if such fees were not paid. The
� �[y- �P3
�
statute is silent on many of these factors. I believe that our office has made this suggestion in the
past, and we wouid be happy to assist in the drafting and prepazation of such an ordinance.
Please feel free to shaze this memo with council members and their aides, or other members of the
administration, as you may see fit.
cc: Tom Fabel
Deputy Mayor
Peg Birk
City Attarney
�
9!-GPs
:���r����;��`
;JLI
(�i�R �9 1995
March 28, 1995
Fred R. Owusu
St. Paul City Clerk
Room 170 City Hall
St. Paul, MN 55102
Gentlemen:
Timothy
St. Paul
St. Paul
St. Paul
Enclosed is a bill for legal services and exper.ses from my
�egal cc�: r:sel, �arl Gray. Z raa pay:ner.t cf this b' 1 i
- � 3 n th�
amount of $18,372.00 pursuant to' Minn. Stat. 465.76, and this
city's past practice of reimbursement of police officer's for legal
Eees in criminal cases arising out of the reasonable and lawful
performance of their duties.
In State v. Jacobsson, I
assault in the fifth degree.
Poritsky after a three day trial.
let me know when I will receive a
�
; r f-
was charged
I was found
Enclosed is
check so I m
GIT� �E�C►KC�FY
ttorn•ay
all
5102
with two counts of
not guilty by Judge
his verdict. Please
ay advise my counsel.
Very truly yours, .
��� �
Officer Jeffrey Jacobsson
I- . F ?
E. Marx
City A
City H
, MN 5
I .
/
qr-�r�
G� M�I�eko
LAW OFr�CES
' Eari P. Gray
Richard J. Malacko
•Afso admitred ro plac:ice in wscor:sn
Jeffrey Jacobsson
19193 Euclid Path
Farmington, NIN 55024
386 North Wabasha SVeet
654 Capi;a( CenVe
54 Paul, Minnesota 55102
(612) 223•5175
r'zx (612) 223-5179
Re: State ci *ii.^.nesota v. �eirrey 3accbsscn
----------------------------------------------
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED:
12/1/94 meeting with client
12/7/94 arraignment and meet with prosecutor re: tape
12/8/94 review file and preparation for trial
12/15J94 Motion To Suppress and letter
1/10/95 interview witnessess and review case
1/24/95 preparation for defense and review tape •
2/6/95 conference with client, research use of
force, review tape
2/15/95 preparation £or pzetrial, review case
and tape
2/16/95 pretrial .
2/27/95 telephone con£erence with prosecutor
preparation for trial
3/9/95 expert test research
3/11/95 preparation £or trial
3/13/95 interview witnesses, telephone conference
with prosacutor, praparaticn for trial,
serve subpoena, telephor.e conference
with clerk
3/14/95 telephone conference probation o£fice
re: subpoena, legal research
3/16/95 meet with witness, study videotape,
trial preparation
3/20/95 trial preparation
3/21/95 trial preparation and trial
3/22/95 trial preparation and trial
3/23/95 trial preparation and trial
72 1/2 hours @$250 per hr.
Less retainer
Office Manag
Carol A. Rumi
ot Counset
Mark D. Nyvc
Michael A. Fe
Hours
2
3
5
1
2 1/2
3
2
2
2 1/2
2
2
3
5
2 1/2
3
2
10
10
10
$18,125.00
-2.500.00
$15,625.00
i y �
i / =,
C'i {; i . i 1
\
j • MRF-2J-1995 10 � 40 '"=,"�1TRA� TEFM OFF [ CE Ei2 292 ,',6'0 F. 01 � p, `��
' /' 1
`j� ���-��- Sc�I�1�i 7�e �z� � A �- -c- S
VERDICT - v � �� UO / �,��� �
STATE v. J..FFR�Y .IACOBSON L,nc;�'-e°K,�Xi7
In thzs cas_ the defendan� faces two charges of Assault
in the FiPth Degrse. Both were alleged to have occurred ay a
resulC of the same iacident on October 18, 1994_ In the £irst
charge, de£endant was alleged to have committed an act upon Wfllie
Howard with intent to cause fear in Willie Howard of immediate
hodily harm or death. In the aecond eharge, it is alleged that
tise de£endant intenta.onally iaflicted or attempted eo infiict
bodily harm upon Willie Howard. The state clearly t�as proven
beyond a reasoztable doubt all the elements of both chazges.
Specifically, with reapect to tite first, I find that defendant
did commit an act - in fact, two acts - with 3ntent to nause fear
in Willie Howard of immediate bodi].y harm. With respec� to the
second charge, I find that defendant inflicted bodily harm upon
Willie Howa'rd and did so intentionally. Of cautse, a21 the acCs
occurxed withzn Ramsey County.
The defensa to these charges is that defendant acted
lawfully and used reasonable force in so acting. Spacifica2ly,
defendant made a pzima facie showing thaC he used reasonable force
,
ia exeeaCing � duty imposed upon him, specifically, the recovery
ot atolen property which would be used as evidence and/or returned
to the lawful owner, pursuant to 689.Ob(S); and also that defendant
aeted pursuant to 509,06(4) 3.n asaisting the lawful owner o£ the
property, Dayton's, and the other retaflers in the same area,
with resisting Wi11ie Howard's further interference with their
�roperty. Defendant having made e pr£ma facie showing that he
—�_
/ I •
hIA�'c-2d 10�41 �v?AL TcA`I GFrI�e 612 292 36'70 P.Q2
� `i� -6�3
actad lawfully, the burden of the peravas3on then ehifted to the
prosecution to disprove the defenae that the de£endant acted wiLh
ressonable force. It 3s my find3ng that the prosecution failed
to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant
is, therefoxe, £ound not guilty on both charg,es,
T'd Iike to make these co�ents for the record. It
is true that aC the Cime the defendant pushed and siapped Willie
Howard, Howard was handcvffed. Moreover, it is clear that ha
was no threat to defendant or any other officer. Howaver, the
officera were under an obligation to take the clotlies from Fioward. �
They were under ehia obligation for two reaaons. First, it appeared
that Howatd had done a conaiderable amount o£ shipliEting, and
the o£ficers were undez an obligaCion to determina wheCher any
of ths itams in HowaYd's poasesaion were stolen and, if ao, from
whom. This would be necessary to determine whethez or not a crime
had been aommiCeed and to gathcr evidence 3n order to prone the
crime later. Second, at some point the officere would have Co
xemave Xoward from Dayton's and take him to the Public Safety
Building. Zt �could be inappropriaCe for them to take Howard to
t'he po7.i,ce station wearing clothea that everyone knew were in •
£aat stolen. Therefore, they were under aa obligation to remove
the stolen property from him, within a reasonable time, before
they le£t the Pub7.ia Safety $uilding,
According tio the teatimvny of Mr. Howard himself, he
had been maintaining that ali the clothes were his and that only
the CD player was sto7.en. This waa true as late as 6:04, when
Howard was talking to Dayton's employee Richard Hasty, Shortly
-2-
I
h7F�i-24-1995 10�4: '��qL TEfaM OFrICE
612 292 36'70 P, a3
q�.68�
thereafter. de£endant came into the room and, as is clear, pushed
How&t'd with considerable force and slagped him on the right side
of Haward's face. Howard thereafter bacame cooperative and agreed
to turn over hfs clothes to Che officers. Up to that time, it
is my finding that Fiowaxd had insisted thaC onlq the CD pLayer
was stalen, and that all Che clothes - even thoae obviously stolen
- were legitimateZy his.
On the ciraumstances, I do not £ind that the state has
proven the officeY's use of force was unreasonable. Both the
parties have spoken of the contiuum of force, and EveretC Doolittle
[phonetia� Ceatified concerning it. One of Che criticai elements
o� evidence in thia case is the faat �hat, even at the lawer levels
of the use of xorce, specifically the eogC, �mpty hand, 1t is
gppropziate for a police officar to inflict minor, temporary,
noninjurious pain upon a sub3acC in oYder to gec that person's
compliance. In my view, that ia exaccly what the defendant did
in this case, There is, it 3.s true, something degrading about
a handcuffed indivi.dual being slapped in the face. Howevex, in
tarms of overall compliance, it seems to be less painful than
continuous pressure ori a pressure point, or continuous joint manipu-
lation, in order to achieve campJ.iance. Any greater force, as
defendant testified when asked about a closed fist, would have
exceeded the bounds of reasonableneas, and an offense would have
been committed.
As to other aiternatives, I concLude that further wait-
ing would have been fruitless, as Howard consistently had main-
tained, even as late as 6:04, that ail the clothes were his. As
-3-
i�YaFt-24-1995 10 � 42 �7� 7EFM � I� 612 292 367g P. 84
- . . �� � i p/! .. •--�
IA .•
to the opCion of again asking Howard to remova hia clothea, I
£ind that that opCioa had been attempted to a reasonable degree
and FToward did noC camply. Fiaally, aa to the option of having
enoagh of£icers force the suspeCt to remove his clothes without
striking hi.m, it is clear thaC this could hava reaulted in injury
to Howard or to the officers. � �
-4-
y»
RIGtIIS, POWERS A.�ID Df,77FS; MUNI(;[PALTITFS 465.77
heating system. The authority may, in conjuncdon with a district heaung system, acquire,��
own, construct, and operate anciilary services related to an energy management and control
system including, but not limited to, sensing and monitorin� services for supervision of fue
and life safety systems and building security systems within the city.
This section shall be effective for a port authority only after adoption of an ordinance or
resolution by the board of the port authority and by the governing body of the city stating
their intention to exercise the authority ailawed by this section.
A port authority may, with approval of the city, lease part or all of the dis�ict heating
system or contract with respect to part or ail of the dish heating system, with any person,
corpora[ion, association, or public utility company for the purpose of construcring, unprov-
ina, operating, or maintaining the district heating system.
Subd. 8. Management of a district heating system by a port authority. A statutory or
home rule charter city within which a port authority has been created may delegate to the port
authority some or ail powen and responsibilities for the management and operation of a dis-
trict heating system.
Subd. 9. Operation by a county. A statutory or home rule charter city may contract
with a county to operate a district heatino system for the provision of district heating services
within some or all of the city. �
History: 1981 c 334 s 6; 1981 c 3.i6 s 248; 1982 c 561 s 12; 1984 c 449 s 1-4;
1987 c 291 s 224, c 312 art 1 s 10 subd 1; 1993 c 327 s 19-21
465.75 REGULATION OF VEHICLE TOWERS LIhIITED.
Subdivision 1. Definitions. For the purposes of this section, the following terms have
the meanings given them:
(a) "Uehicle tower" means a person enga�ed in the business of towing or recovering
vehicles by means of a crane, hoist, tow bar, tow line, or dolly for the purpose of moving or
transporting wrecked, daznaged, disabled, replacement, or abandoned vehicles; and
@) "Municipality" means a statutory or home rule charter city or a town.
Subd. 2. Request by owner. I3o municipality may prohibit the operation within its
boundaries of a vehicle tower who is not licensed by that municipaliry and who is responding
to a service request from a person who is the owner or operator or the agent of the owner or
operator of the motor vehicle for which vetricle towin= service is requested.
Subd. 3. Private property. No vehicle tower may remove a motor vehicle by towing,
carrying, haulin� or pushin� from private property except at the request of a person who is the
owner or operator or the agent of the owner or operator of the vehicle, or the owner or agent of
the owner of the private property.
History: 1983 c 115 s 1
465.76 LEGAL COUNSEL; REII�IBURSEb1ENT.
If reimbursement is requested by the o�cer or employee, the goveming body of a home
rule charter or statutory city or county may, after consultation with its legal counsel, reim-
burse a city or counry officer or employee for any costs and reasonable attorney's fees in-
curred by the person to defend chazges of a criminal nature brouoht against the person that
arose out of the reasonable and lawful performance of duties for the city or county, provided
if less than a quorum of the goveming body is disinterested, that such reimbursement shall be
approved by a judge of the district court.
History: 1984 c 650 s 1
465•77 REGULATION OF DRILLING TO PROTECT NIINED UNDERGROUND
SPACE DEVELOPMENT.
A home rule charter city or statutory city may regulate driiling for the purposes and in
�e manner provided in section 469.141.
History: 1985 c 194 s 25: 1987 c 291 s 225
\
/
Presented By
Refened To
��������
RESOLUTION
CITY OF SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA
L[I;
C e �. -
RESOLVED, that upon the request of Jeffrey Jacobsson, pursuant to Minn. Stat. §
465.76, for reunbursement of attorney's fees incuned by him in the defense of a criminal charges
against him, which charges the Council finds azose out of the reasonable and lawful performance
of duties for the City of Saint Paul, and after consultation with the office of the city attorney, the
Council hereby directs that the appropriate city officials pay the amount of $16,000 by draft
payable jointly to the said Jeffrey Jacobsson and Earl P. Gray, attorney for Jacobsson, in fu11 and
complete reimbursement for said fees.
Requested by Department of:
By:
Adopted by Councii: Date ���
Adoption Certified by Council S etary
By: � -�
Approve + �ayo . Date
By:
�I
Form Ap roved by City Attorney
B � � l� �u 7- 2 -9�
Approved by Mayor for Submission to Counci]
By:
Council File # "\ 6� G d 3
Green Sheet # � ��_�
t•�`�I
Council
OATEINITNTm
7/29/98 GREEN SHEET
n,o 62171
GOUIICli YTeS. JSOStTOm Ybb-25bbU Uo[rutr�rtueBCrat L�rnYCwMCI—
JSTBEONCOUNGLAGENDABY(Q4T�
AUG. 5, 1998 �"
MUYBERiOR tliYAiiORIEY CRYGiNIt
ROViING
� ❑ RIRIICULfERVICFiON. HIYYLLfErtV/11CCf6
❑ wroRlortbmxAMt) ❑
TOTAL # OF SIGNATURE PAGES (CLJP ALL LOCATIONS FOR SIGNATURE)
Reimburing attorney fees to Saint Paul Police Officer for his defense of criminal charges
in the amount of $16,000.00
PLANNING COMMISSION
CIB COMMITTEE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Has fhis persoNfirm everworked under a wrRract for thic departmeM?
YES NO
Has ihia DereoNfirtn a:er been a city empbyee9
YES NO
Does this persoNfirm possess a sldll not nwmallypossessetl by any curteM ciry empbyee?
YES NO
is Mis pereonRirtn a targeted venda?
YES NO
R�S'���Ch £.'•sn+��
APPROVED
r.r.�i_�m.:ar��.�
OF TRANSACTION S
SOURCE
COSTIREVQIUE BUD6ETED (CIRCIE ON�
ACTIVITY NUMBER
YES NO
(EJ�IAIN)
\
�
q�-c.8�
FAC'T SHEET
Jacobsson Reimbursement
Officer was on dury, in uniform. October 18, 1994.
He struck handcuffed suspect (on video tape) at Dayton's.
Deroartmental discipline
Officer was disciplined, and received a 7-day suspension for this and one other incident.
Criminal chazees
OfFcer was chazged with 2 counts of 5`" degree assault.
Judge Poritsky acquitted on both counts after trial, finding that the force used by the officer was
not unzeasonable. 3- -95
Earl Crray's bill to the officer was $18,125.00. Part of that was a retainer of $2500, which has
been paid, but I am not sure whether the Federation or the officer paid it. Earl would take
$16,000 total in "settlemenY' to avoid fiirther delays.
Civil liabilitv
Suit by suspect was settled for $8,000; $6,000 by City, $2,000 by Dayton's.
Suspecdvictim
The suspect was convicted of felony theft, got 13 months and fine, 5 yeazs probation. 1-3-95.
/.
qS-GP3
Interdepartmental Memorandum
CITY OF SAINT PAUL
DATE: July 2, 1998
TO: Council President Dan Bostrom ��������
FROM:
Phil Byrne�
� ��
J U L 2_ 1998
�" �� ��
._
RE: Officer Jacobsson request for reimbursement
Background and Facts
Offlcer Jef&ey Jacobsson of the Saint Paul Police Department has requested, through his attorney,
Eazl P. Cnay, that he be reimbursed for attorney's fees that he l�as incurred in the defense of crimnial
charges against him.
The bill for attorney's fees presented to the officer was $18,125.00, of which the attorney has
received a$2,500.00 retainer. A copy of that bill is attached. In my opinion Mr. Gray's bill and his
hourly rate is reasonable given (1) his experience, skill and reputation as a criminal defense lawyer
in the community, and (2) the fact that the matter went to trial, and required full triai preparation and
trial tune. While the bill should not necessarily reflect the outcome, attorneys who prepaze fully and
in detail will more often than not obtain a better result, and in this case the judge rendered a verdict
of not guilty. In this case, I have spoken with Mr. Gray, and he is willing to accept less than the total
amount, i.e., $16,000, if he can save the time and preparation of an appearance before the Council
on the matter. The resolution I have prepazed reflects that willingness.
The incident, occurring October 18, 1994, involved a person in custody on charges of shoplifting,
whom the officer was charged with assauiting while the person was handcuffed. The officer was
acquitted of the assault charges after a trial to the court. A copy of the judge's memarandum decision
is attached. It should be noted that the judge deternvned that the degree of force that the officer used
was not shown to be unreasonable under all the facts. The particular judge is respected and has an
excellent reputation in the judicial and legal community.
The person who was in custody ultimately was convicted of felony theft on January 3, 1995, and
received a felony-level sentence.
� q� -Gt3
The officer was disciplined by the police department, and received a 7-day suspension for this and
another incident.
A civil suit brought by the arrested person against the City and the department store was settled
favorably, with the City paying $6,000 and the deparnnent store $2,000.
LeFal Analysis
Minn. Stat. § 465.76, a copy of which is attached, allows but does not require a ciry (after
consultation with its own legal counsel) to reimburse an employee for legal fees arising out of the
defense against criminal charges when those chazges arose out of the reasonable and lawful
performance of duties for the city.
The city has in the past considered such requests, and each appears to have been handled on the
particulaz facts and merits of each such request.
The officer in this case was on duty, in uniform and responding to a call for police services. It
appeazs that the Council could reasonably determine, in view of the finding of the trial court that the
degree of force used was reasonabie, that this incident "azose out of the reasonable and lawful
performance of duties for the city ... ." The Council could reasonably deternvne that as a policy
matter the judgment of a police officer made during an incident involving potenrial crime should be
second-guessed only with care, particulazly when supported by a later judicial fmding. It could
determine as well that the disciplinary sanction was punishxnent enough, and that the additional
burden of legal defense fees is too much.
On the other hand, the statute is discretionary, and does not mandate reimbursement. The Council
could reasonably decide that it would never pay for criminal defense fees when the matter involves
an alleged assault on a handcuffed person in custody. The Council could also determine not to pay
legai defense fees in cases where the City is required to pay money in settlement of a civil suit.
Recommendation
For whatever it is worth, my recommendation is that the officer be reimbursed as indicated in the
resolution.
However, I would also recommend that you give some consideration to the passage of an ordinance
that would establish a procedure for considering reimbursement claims of this kind, as well as the
development of standards or criteria by which you wouid evaluate future claims. The types of
standards or factars might include whether the employee was acquitted of the charges, and the basis
for the acquittal; the nature of the alleged offense, and its degree of severity; collateral matters such
as civii suits and internal disciplinary actions and what those outcomes were; whether the employee
was acting at the direction of a supervisor or superior; degree of good faith involved in the action;
whether the morale of other employees would be adversely affected if the fees were paid or not paid;
and whether employees and officers would be less likely to cany out job responsibilities in the
vigorous manner that would be consistent with the public interest if such fees were not paid. The
� �[y- �P3
�
statute is silent on many of these factors. I believe that our office has made this suggestion in the
past, and we wouid be happy to assist in the drafting and prepazation of such an ordinance.
Please feel free to shaze this memo with council members and their aides, or other members of the
administration, as you may see fit.
cc: Tom Fabel
Deputy Mayor
Peg Birk
City Attarney
�
9!-GPs
:���r����;��`
;JLI
(�i�R �9 1995
March 28, 1995
Fred R. Owusu
St. Paul City Clerk
Room 170 City Hall
St. Paul, MN 55102
Gentlemen:
Timothy
St. Paul
St. Paul
St. Paul
Enclosed is a bill for legal services and exper.ses from my
�egal cc�: r:sel, �arl Gray. Z raa pay:ner.t cf this b' 1 i
- � 3 n th�
amount of $18,372.00 pursuant to' Minn. Stat. 465.76, and this
city's past practice of reimbursement of police officer's for legal
Eees in criminal cases arising out of the reasonable and lawful
performance of their duties.
In State v. Jacobsson, I
assault in the fifth degree.
Poritsky after a three day trial.
let me know when I will receive a
�
; r f-
was charged
I was found
Enclosed is
check so I m
GIT� �E�C►KC�FY
ttorn•ay
all
5102
with two counts of
not guilty by Judge
his verdict. Please
ay advise my counsel.
Very truly yours, .
��� �
Officer Jeffrey Jacobsson
I- . F ?
E. Marx
City A
City H
, MN 5
I .
/
qr-�r�
G� M�I�eko
LAW OFr�CES
' Eari P. Gray
Richard J. Malacko
•Afso admitred ro plac:ice in wscor:sn
Jeffrey Jacobsson
19193 Euclid Path
Farmington, NIN 55024
386 North Wabasha SVeet
654 Capi;a( CenVe
54 Paul, Minnesota 55102
(612) 223•5175
r'zx (612) 223-5179
Re: State ci *ii.^.nesota v. �eirrey 3accbsscn
----------------------------------------------
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED:
12/1/94 meeting with client
12/7/94 arraignment and meet with prosecutor re: tape
12/8/94 review file and preparation for trial
12/15J94 Motion To Suppress and letter
1/10/95 interview witnessess and review case
1/24/95 preparation for defense and review tape •
2/6/95 conference with client, research use of
force, review tape
2/15/95 preparation £or pzetrial, review case
and tape
2/16/95 pretrial .
2/27/95 telephone con£erence with prosecutor
preparation for trial
3/9/95 expert test research
3/11/95 preparation £or trial
3/13/95 interview witnesses, telephone conference
with prosacutor, praparaticn for trial,
serve subpoena, telephor.e conference
with clerk
3/14/95 telephone conference probation o£fice
re: subpoena, legal research
3/16/95 meet with witness, study videotape,
trial preparation
3/20/95 trial preparation
3/21/95 trial preparation and trial
3/22/95 trial preparation and trial
3/23/95 trial preparation and trial
72 1/2 hours @$250 per hr.
Less retainer
Office Manag
Carol A. Rumi
ot Counset
Mark D. Nyvc
Michael A. Fe
Hours
2
3
5
1
2 1/2
3
2
2
2 1/2
2
2
3
5
2 1/2
3
2
10
10
10
$18,125.00
-2.500.00
$15,625.00
i y �
i / =,
C'i {; i . i 1
\
j • MRF-2J-1995 10 � 40 '"=,"�1TRA� TEFM OFF [ CE Ei2 292 ,',6'0 F. 01 � p, `��
' /' 1
`j� ���-��- Sc�I�1�i 7�e �z� � A �- -c- S
VERDICT - v � �� UO / �,��� �
STATE v. J..FFR�Y .IACOBSON L,nc;�'-e°K,�Xi7
In thzs cas_ the defendan� faces two charges of Assault
in the FiPth Degrse. Both were alleged to have occurred ay a
resulC of the same iacident on October 18, 1994_ In the £irst
charge, de£endant was alleged to have committed an act upon Wfllie
Howard with intent to cause fear in Willie Howard of immediate
hodily harm or death. In the aecond eharge, it is alleged that
tise de£endant intenta.onally iaflicted or attempted eo infiict
bodily harm upon Willie Howard. The state clearly t�as proven
beyond a reasoztable doubt all the elements of both chazges.
Specifically, with reapect to tite first, I find that defendant
did commit an act - in fact, two acts - with 3ntent to nause fear
in Willie Howard of immediate bodi].y harm. With respec� to the
second charge, I find that defendant inflicted bodily harm upon
Willie Howa'rd and did so intentionally. Of cautse, a21 the acCs
occurxed withzn Ramsey County.
The defensa to these charges is that defendant acted
lawfully and used reasonable force in so acting. Spacifica2ly,
defendant made a pzima facie showing thaC he used reasonable force
,
ia exeeaCing � duty imposed upon him, specifically, the recovery
ot atolen property which would be used as evidence and/or returned
to the lawful owner, pursuant to 689.Ob(S); and also that defendant
aeted pursuant to 509,06(4) 3.n asaisting the lawful owner o£ the
property, Dayton's, and the other retaflers in the same area,
with resisting Wi11ie Howard's further interference with their
�roperty. Defendant having made e pr£ma facie showing that he
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hIA�'c-2d 10�41 �v?AL TcA`I GFrI�e 612 292 36'70 P.Q2
� `i� -6�3
actad lawfully, the burden of the peravas3on then ehifted to the
prosecution to disprove the defenae that the de£endant acted wiLh
ressonable force. It 3s my find3ng that the prosecution failed
to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant
is, therefoxe, £ound not guilty on both charg,es,
T'd Iike to make these co�ents for the record. It
is true that aC the Cime the defendant pushed and siapped Willie
Howard, Howard was handcvffed. Moreover, it is clear that ha
was no threat to defendant or any other officer. Howaver, the
officera were under an obligation to take the clotlies from Fioward. �
They were under ehia obligation for two reaaons. First, it appeared
that Howatd had done a conaiderable amount o£ shipliEting, and
the o£ficers were undez an obligaCion to determina wheCher any
of ths itams in HowaYd's poasesaion were stolen and, if ao, from
whom. This would be necessary to determine whethez or not a crime
had been aommiCeed and to gathcr evidence 3n order to prone the
crime later. Second, at some point the officere would have Co
xemave Xoward from Dayton's and take him to the Public Safety
Building. Zt �could be inappropriaCe for them to take Howard to
t'he po7.i,ce station wearing clothea that everyone knew were in •
£aat stolen. Therefore, they were under aa obligation to remove
the stolen property from him, within a reasonable time, before
they le£t the Pub7.ia Safety $uilding,
According tio the teatimvny of Mr. Howard himself, he
had been maintaining that ali the clothes were his and that only
the CD player was sto7.en. This waa true as late as 6:04, when
Howard was talking to Dayton's employee Richard Hasty, Shortly
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I
h7F�i-24-1995 10�4: '��qL TEfaM OFrICE
612 292 36'70 P, a3
q�.68�
thereafter. de£endant came into the room and, as is clear, pushed
How&t'd with considerable force and slagped him on the right side
of Haward's face. Howard thereafter bacame cooperative and agreed
to turn over hfs clothes to Che officers. Up to that time, it
is my finding that Fiowaxd had insisted thaC onlq the CD pLayer
was stalen, and that all Che clothes - even thoae obviously stolen
- were legitimateZy his.
On the ciraumstances, I do not £ind that the state has
proven the officeY's use of force was unreasonable. Both the
parties have spoken of the contiuum of force, and EveretC Doolittle
[phonetia� Ceatified concerning it. One of Che criticai elements
o� evidence in thia case is the faat �hat, even at the lawer levels
of the use of xorce, specifically the eogC, �mpty hand, 1t is
gppropziate for a police officar to inflict minor, temporary,
noninjurious pain upon a sub3acC in oYder to gec that person's
compliance. In my view, that ia exaccly what the defendant did
in this case, There is, it 3.s true, something degrading about
a handcuffed indivi.dual being slapped in the face. Howevex, in
tarms of overall compliance, it seems to be less painful than
continuous pressure ori a pressure point, or continuous joint manipu-
lation, in order to achieve campJ.iance. Any greater force, as
defendant testified when asked about a closed fist, would have
exceeded the bounds of reasonableneas, and an offense would have
been committed.
As to other aiternatives, I concLude that further wait-
ing would have been fruitless, as Howard consistently had main-
tained, even as late as 6:04, that ail the clothes were his. As
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i�YaFt-24-1995 10 � 42 �7� 7EFM � I� 612 292 367g P. 84
- . . �� � i p/! .. •--�
IA .•
to the opCion of again asking Howard to remova hia clothea, I
£ind that that opCioa had been attempted to a reasonable degree
and FToward did noC camply. Fiaally, aa to the option of having
enoagh of£icers force the suspeCt to remove his clothes without
striking hi.m, it is clear thaC this could hava reaulted in injury
to Howard or to the officers. � �
-4-
y»
RIGtIIS, POWERS A.�ID Df,77FS; MUNI(;[PALTITFS 465.77
heating system. The authority may, in conjuncdon with a district heaung system, acquire,��
own, construct, and operate anciilary services related to an energy management and control
system including, but not limited to, sensing and monitorin� services for supervision of fue
and life safety systems and building security systems within the city.
This section shall be effective for a port authority only after adoption of an ordinance or
resolution by the board of the port authority and by the governing body of the city stating
their intention to exercise the authority ailawed by this section.
A port authority may, with approval of the city, lease part or all of the dis�ict heating
system or contract with respect to part or ail of the dish heating system, with any person,
corpora[ion, association, or public utility company for the purpose of construcring, unprov-
ina, operating, or maintaining the district heating system.
Subd. 8. Management of a district heating system by a port authority. A statutory or
home rule charter city within which a port authority has been created may delegate to the port
authority some or ail powen and responsibilities for the management and operation of a dis-
trict heating system.
Subd. 9. Operation by a county. A statutory or home rule charter city may contract
with a county to operate a district heatino system for the provision of district heating services
within some or all of the city. �
History: 1981 c 334 s 6; 1981 c 3.i6 s 248; 1982 c 561 s 12; 1984 c 449 s 1-4;
1987 c 291 s 224, c 312 art 1 s 10 subd 1; 1993 c 327 s 19-21
465.75 REGULATION OF VEHICLE TOWERS LIhIITED.
Subdivision 1. Definitions. For the purposes of this section, the following terms have
the meanings given them:
(a) "Uehicle tower" means a person enga�ed in the business of towing or recovering
vehicles by means of a crane, hoist, tow bar, tow line, or dolly for the purpose of moving or
transporting wrecked, daznaged, disabled, replacement, or abandoned vehicles; and
@) "Municipality" means a statutory or home rule charter city or a town.
Subd. 2. Request by owner. I3o municipality may prohibit the operation within its
boundaries of a vehicle tower who is not licensed by that municipaliry and who is responding
to a service request from a person who is the owner or operator or the agent of the owner or
operator of the motor vehicle for which vetricle towin= service is requested.
Subd. 3. Private property. No vehicle tower may remove a motor vehicle by towing,
carrying, haulin� or pushin� from private property except at the request of a person who is the
owner or operator or the agent of the owner or operator of the vehicle, or the owner or agent of
the owner of the private property.
History: 1983 c 115 s 1
465.76 LEGAL COUNSEL; REII�IBURSEb1ENT.
If reimbursement is requested by the o�cer or employee, the goveming body of a home
rule charter or statutory city or county may, after consultation with its legal counsel, reim-
burse a city or counry officer or employee for any costs and reasonable attorney's fees in-
curred by the person to defend chazges of a criminal nature brouoht against the person that
arose out of the reasonable and lawful performance of duties for the city or county, provided
if less than a quorum of the goveming body is disinterested, that such reimbursement shall be
approved by a judge of the district court.
History: 1984 c 650 s 1
465•77 REGULATION OF DRILLING TO PROTECT NIINED UNDERGROUND
SPACE DEVELOPMENT.
A home rule charter city or statutory city may regulate driiling for the purposes and in
�e manner provided in section 469.141.
History: 1985 c 194 s 25: 1987 c 291 s 225